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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 This study examines managerial incentives and practices associated with firms’ tax 
strategy choices, as well as the relative importance of these factors in determining the primary 
focus of firms’ tax strategies.  Understanding the determinants of firms’ tax strategy choices is 
important because the Scholes-Wolfson framework argues that the goal of effective tax planning 
is to maximize after-tax returns.  Therefore, identifying managerial incentives and practices that 
influence tax strategy choice provides insight into how firms encourage tax planning to improve 
firm value.  Using seemingly unrelated bivariate probit regression, I investigate firms’ tendencies 
to focus on one of two tax strategies: a sustainable tax strategy, which strives to achieve a 
consistent tax outcome over time, and a minimization tax strategy, which seeks to achieve the 
lowest possible tax outcome.   
 Controlling for the interdependence of tax strategies, I find that firms are more likely to 
emphasize a sustainable tax strategy when the CEO’s wealth is more sensitive to changes in the 
firm’s stock price and less likely to emphasize sustainability when the firm receives more 
information from its directors’ connections.  In contrast, a firm is more likely to concentrate on a 
minimization tax strategy when the CEO’s wealth is more sensitive to changes in stock return 
volatility, the firm hires a tax expert audit firm for tax services, or the firm receives more 
information from its directors’ connections.  Finally, I find that managerial incentives are the 
most important factors for the choice of tax strategy, followed by the practices of obtaining 
expert tax advice and information from directors’ connections.  This study contributes to the 
literature by providing evidence that managerial incentives and practices are associated with 
firms’ tax strategy choices, a decision that precedes observed tax outcomes and cannot 
  iii 
necessarily be inferred from tax outcomes alone.  Furthermore, a firm’s tax outcome depends 
upon its tax strategy, and thus, by identifying managerial incentives and practices that affect tax 
strategy choice, this study provides an additional explanation for the variation in tax outcomes 
observed across firms, as well as develops expectations regarding the tax strategy that firms are 
likely to employ.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that a firm’s tax strategy consists of at 
least two recognizable dimensions, sustainability and minimization (e.g., Deloitte LLP 2013; 
KPMG LLP 2007; McGuire et al. 2013).  The dimension of a firm’s tax strategy that focuses on 
sustainability strives to achieve a consistent tax outcome over time (i.e., a narrow range of 
effective tax rates (ETRs)), with less regard for that tax outcome’s level (McGuire et al. 2013; 
Neuman et al. 2013).  In contrast, the dimension of a firm’s tax strategy that focuses on 
minimization seeks to reduce the firm’s tax burden and achieve the lowest possible tax outcome 
(i.e., a low ETR).  Despite the presence of multiple dimensions, prior research generally focuses 
on firms’ tax avoidance with the implicit assumption that all firms emphasize the level of tax 
avoidance (i.e., minimization) (Shackelford and Shevlin 2001; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010); 
however, only a subset of firms are able to achieve low ETRs (Dyreng et al. 2008), implying that 
there are alternative approaches to maximizing after-tax returns.  I extend this line of research by 
investigating why firms choose to concentrate more on sustainability or minimization.  
Specifically, I examine the managerial incentives and practices associated with firms’ tax 
strategy choices, as well as the relative importance of these factors in determining the primary 
focus of firms’ tax strategies.1 
Understanding the determinants of firms’ tax strategy choices is important because the 
Scholes-Wolfson framework argues that the goal of effective tax planning, which is the 
underpinning of tax strategy, is to maximize after-tax returns and firm value (Scholes et al. 
2009).  Therefore, by identifying managerial incentives and practices that influence tax strategy 
                                                 
1 Consistent with the prior research, I acknowledge that sustainability and minimization are two 
dimensions of the overarching tax strategy. However, similar to the strategy literature, for ease of 
exposition, I will also refer to them as sustainable or minimization tax strategies. 
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choice, this study provides insight into how firms encourage tax planning to improve firm value.  
The management literature defines a strategy as an observable pattern in decision-making 
(Hambrick 1981, 1983; Miles and Snow 1978; Mintzberg 1978), and prior research finds that 
strategies are inherently multi-faceted because firms can achieve the strategy’s objective using 
different approaches (Hambrick 1983; Miller 1986, 1987; March 1991; Porter 2004; Shapiro 
1989; Zahra and Covin 1993).  For example, when developing the typologies of business 
strategy, Miles and Snow (1978) suggest that firms can follow one of two primary approaches 
for competing in a product market – an innovation strategy or an efficiency strategy.  Firms can 
successfully compete using either business strategy, but the two models of production differ; 
thus, firms choose a business strategy that complements their competitive advantage.  Similarly, 
firms must balance tax and other organizational considerations to maximize firm value (Dyreng 
et al. 2008; Scholes et al. 2009).  Therefore, like other firm strategies, there are different, yet 
equally effective, approaches to tax strategy. 
Prior research identifies two different dimensions of a firm’s tax strategy that help 
maximize after-tax returns: improving the consistency of the tax outcome and reducing cash 
taxes paid.  The literature demonstrates the importance of non-tax considerations for tax 
planning (e.g., Scholes et al. 2009) and indicates that firms attempt to avoid tax-related surprises 
(Schmidt 2006; Armstrong et al. 2012; TEI 2005) and balance tax avoidance and financial 
reporting costs (Mills 1998; Mills and Newberry 2001), implying that consistent or sustainable 
tax outcomes are preferable in some situations.  Practitioners also market tax planning activities 
with sustainable outcomes because such tax strategies increase long-term firm value (Deloitte 
LLP 2013; KPMG LLP 2007; PwC 2008).  However, there is also ample evidence consistent 
with the notion that some firms emphasize the lowest tax outcome (minimization).  For example, 
prior research suggests that managers are often incentivized to obtain low ETRs (Phillips 2003; 
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Robinson et al. 2010; Armstrong et al. 2012), and anecdotal and empirical evidence indicates 
that some firms are able to achieve low ETRs (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2008; Schumpeter 2012; 
Kocieniewski 2011; Duhigg and Kocieniewski 2012).   
Unique costs and benefits accompany each tax strategy.  Firms emphasizing 
sustainability experience low year-to-year variability in tax outcomes (Deloitte LLP 2013; 
KPMG LLP 2007; PwC 2008), improving firm value through lower earnings and cash flow 
volatility (e.g., Barth et al. 1999; Myers et al. 2007; Rountree et al. 2008) and reducing the 
possibility of unfavorable financial reporting effects (Mills 1998; Scholes et al. 2009).  
Furthermore, sustainable tax strategies reduce firms’ exposure to negative press related to tax 
planning issues (Deloitte LLP 2013), which can result in significant reputation costs (Hanlon and 
Slemrod 2009).  However, by investing in tax planning that produces more predictable tax 
outcomes, these firms could be paying more tax than required (Deloitte LLP 2013; McGuire et 
al. 2013; TEI 2005).  Firms focusing on minimization benefit from the increased cash flow of 
lower explicit tax burdens (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Maydew 1996; Mills 1998; Phillips 
2003), which provides additional funds for investing (Armstrong et al. 2012; Ayers et al. 2009; 
Schumpeter 2012).  However, low ETRs also increase the risk of audit by revenue authorities, 
possibly resulting in penalties and fines for disallowed tax avoidance (Ayers et al. 2009; Cloyd 
1995; Cloyd et al. 1996; Mills 1998; Mills and Sansing 2000; Schumpeter 2012), and tax 
minimization can create significant reputation costs (Hanlon and Slemrod 2009).   
Although both tax strategies have costs and benefits, it is important to note that either 
strategy can be value-maximizing.  Prior literature indicates that commonly-observed typologies 
within strategies are capable of allowing firms to earn acceptable returns (Porter 2004), which 
implies that, if properly implemented, either tax strategy (i.e., emphasizing sustainability or 
minimization) can successfully maximize after-tax firm value.  In other words, in an absolute 
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sense, one tax strategy is not better than the other.  However, at the individual level, firms’ 
unique situations ultimately determine the most appropriate strategic approach because certain 
circumstances are better suited for one strategy than another (Porter 2004; Miles et al. 1978; 
Hambrick 1983).2  Therefore, in this study, I am interested in investigating firms’ tax strategy 
decisions and improving our understanding of why firms choose to emphasize a sustainable or 
minimization tax strategy.    
The purpose of this study is to examine the determinants of firms’ tax strategy choices.  
The objective of managerial incentives and practices is to shape managers’ values and facilitate 
decision-making that is consistent with shareholders’ interests (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
Mills et al. (1998) assert that investments in tax planning, and thus tax strategy, will vary with 
managements’ practices and incentives.  Therefore, controlling for investments in tax planning, 
the choice of tax strategy likely depends upon the incentives and practices in place at the firm.  
Accordingly, I examine the association between the choice of tax strategy and three managerial 
incentives and practices: providing equity incentives, obtaining expert tax advice, and 
transferring information through directorships.      
The compensation contract informs the manager about shareholders’ objectives and the 
manner in which he/she should approach maximizing firm value (Diamond and Verrecchia 1982; 
Holmstrom 1979; Jensen and Meckling 1976).  Shareholders value tax planning because tax 
strategy contributes to profitability (Scholes et al. 2009); thus, managerial incentives should 
align managers’ and shareholders’ interests with respect to tax strategy decisions (Hanlon and 
Heitzman 2010), and are therefore, potentially important for tax strategy choice.  Prior research 
supports this argument and finds that compensation and equity incentives are associated with 
                                                 
2 This idea is analogous to the business strategy literature which indicates that both innovation and 
efficiency are value-creating means of production, but that firms will choose to focus on the business 
strategy that aligns with their competitive advantages. 
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firms’ tax avoidance (Armstrong et al. 2012; Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Phillips 2003; Rego 
and Wilson 2012), consistent with shareholders providing incentives to encourage tax planning 
(Hanlon and Heitzman 2010).   
Equity incentives encourage different types of behavior.  Increasing the sensitivity of the 
manager’s wealth to changes in the stock price (delta) encourages the manager to increase the 
stock price.  Prior research has shown that firms with more persistent earnings exhibit higher 
stock prices (e.g., Barth et al. 1999; Kasnik and McNichols 2002; Myers et al. 2007) and firms 
with more sustainable tax strategies exhibit more persistent earnings (McGuire et al. 2013), 
which suggests that, if managers are incentivized to increase the stock price, they may be more 
likely to emphasize sustainability.  On the other hand, increasing the sensitivity of the managers’ 
wealth to stock return volatility (vega) encourages the manager to make relatively more risky 
investments.  A minimization tax strategy will likely require the manager to undertake 
aggressive tax avoidance activities or uncertain tax positions (Hanlon et al. 2007; Rego and 
Wilson 2012), which suggests that, if managers are incentivized to invest in relatively more risky 
projects, they may be more likely to emphasize minimization.  Therefore, I hypothesize that a 
firm is more likely to implement a sustainable (minimization) tax strategy as its managers’ 
wealth becomes more sensitive to changes in the stock price (stock return volatility). 
In addition to managerial incentives, I also consider two managerial practices, obtaining 
expert tax advice and transferring information through directorships, which facilitate the spread 
of tax planning ideas and represent sources of information that may be helpful for implementing 
a tax strategy.  It is costly and difficult for individual firms or managers to develop or identify 
tax avoidance activities, but external sources of tax planning information could be an efficient 
way to ascertain tax planning opportunities, and thus, access to these sources could influence 
firms’ tax strategy choices.   
  6 
Expert tax advice represents a valuable source of tax planning information because 
accounting firms invest in training and tax planning knowledge to serve their clients’ needs 
(Ferguson et al. 2003; Solomon et al. 1999).  Thus, tax experts are likely able to offer 
information about the most recent tax planning innovations, as well as industry-specific tax 
avoidance activities, which can improve their clients’ abilities to emphasize minimization 
(Deloitte Development LLC 2013; Ernst & Young 2013; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2013).  On 
the other hand, practitioners specifically market tax planning activities with sustainable tax 
outcomes (Deloitte LLP 2013; KPMG LLP 2007; PwC 2008); thus, expert tax advice could also 
be associated with the choice of a sustainable tax strategy.  Therefore, depending on the relative 
amounts of information tax experts provide about the two tax strategies, professional advice 
from tax experts could be associated with a higher likelihood of choosing either tax strategy.   
Firms can also benefit from the tax information transferred via connections among 
members of boards of directors.  The relationships among directors form an extensive network 
across which information, including corporate policies, is shared, and prior research 
demonstrates that firms are more likely to implement a policy or strategy found at another firm 
when connections among directors exist (e.g., Gulati and Westphal 1999; Bizjak et al. 2009).3  
Because information pertaining to many corporate policies reaches firms via directors’ 
interactions, tax planning information is likely to travel in a similar manner.  Consistent with this 
notion, Brown (2011) documents that tax shelter use spreads through board interlocks.  
Furthermore, tax directors meet regularly with the board, particularly the audit committee, to 
discuss tax planning (ATA 2014), indicating that directors have direct communication with the 
individuals responsible for implementing tax strategy.  Thus, anecdotal and empirical evidence 
                                                 
3 Prior research provides evidence consistent with both value-increasing (e.g., Gulati and Westphal 1999; 
Haunschild 1993; Palmer et al. 1986; Palmer et al. 1989) and value-decreasing (e.g., Bizjak et al. 2009; 
Dooley 1969; Pennings 1980) corporate policies traveling between firms through links among directors. 
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suggests that directors discuss tax planning opportunities and that information transferred 
through directors could be influential for the choice of tax strategy.  Depending on their 
connections, directors will have access to different types of tax planning information (i.e., 
predictable (innovative) tax planning opportunities which facilitate sustainability 
(minimization)).  Therefore, depending on the relative amounts of information directors provide 
about tax strategies, information transferred through directors’ connections could be associated 
with a higher likelihood of choosing either tax strategy.   
To investigate whether managerial incentives and practices are associated with firms’ 
tax strategy choices, I examine the association between equity incentives, expert tax advice, and 
information transferred through directorships and the decision to emphasize a sustainable or 
minimization tax strategy.  Following prior research in accounting and management (e.g., 
Bentley et al. 2012; Hambrick 1981, 1983; Higgins et al. 2014; Ittner et al. 1997), I focus on two 
distinct tax strategies, sustainability and minimization, and examine firms that have made an 
explicit tax strategy choice.  I classify a firm as adopting a sustainable tax strategy if its 
coefficient of variation of cash ETRs, measured from t to t-4 (McGuire et al. 2013; Neuman et 
al. 2013), is in the lowest quintile for the year and as emphasizing a minimization tax strategy if 
its three-year cash ETR, measured from t to t-2 (Dyreng et al. 2008), is less than or equal to 20 
percent.4,5  I measure equity incentives using delta and vega (Core and Guay 1999; Guay 1999), 
expert tax advice using audit firm tax expertise (McGuire et al. 2012), and information 
                                                 
4 My results remain unchanged if I use the five-year cash ETR to define a minimization tax strategy. 
 
5 My approach of using observable tax outcomes measured over a period of time to infer firms’ 
unobservable tax strategies is consistent with the methodology of empirical analyses of business strategy 
(e.g., Bentley et al. 2012; Higgins et al. 2014) in which firm characteristics derived from financial 
statement data are used to operationalize unobservable business strategy.   
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transferred through directorships using director connectedness (Newman 2010; Omer et al. 2012, 
2014).6   
Using a sample of firm-year observations at the intersection of the Compustat, CRSP, 
Execucomp, Audit Analytics, and Risk Metrics databases from 2000-2010, I investigate firms’ 
tendencies to focus on one of two tax strategies using seemingly unrelated bivariate probit 
regression.  I use this methodology because the two dimensions of tax strategy are not 
independent (i.e., the decision to concentrate on sustainability is related to the decision to 
concentrate on minimization); thus, the probability of making a particular decision must be 
estimated assuming a joint distribution for both tax strategies (Woolridge 2010, 595-6).  
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit regression models both tax strategy choices together, 
controlling for the simultaneous determination of the decision to focus on one dimension of tax 
strategy and forego emphasizing the other.  
Controlling for both the interdependence of these tax strategies and firm characteristics 
that could affect both tax planning resources and opportunities, my results indicate that, when the 
CEO’s wealth is more sensitive to changes in stock price (i.e., larger delta), the firm is more 
likely to concentrate on sustainability, suggesting that managers align the firm’s tax strategy with 
their incentives to increase the stock price.  However, firms that incentivize their CEOs to make 
riskier decisions (i.e., larger vega) are more likely to emphasize minimization, consistent with 
these managers being rewarded for volatility which results from investing in activities with less 
predictable outcomes.  With respect to expert tax advice, I find that firms that hire a tax expert 
audit firm for tax services are more likely to focus on minimization, consistent with these firms 
utilizing tax experts’ knowledge of the latest tax planning opportunities to reduce their tax 
                                                 
6 To measure information transfer among directors comprehensively, I use social network analysis and a 
vector of four centrality measures for firms’ directors following the methodology of Newman (2010), 
rather than using board interlocks. 
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burdens.  Finally, I find that firms that receive substantial information from their directors’ 
connections are less likely to focus on a sustainable tax strategy and more likely to emphasize a 
minimization tax strategy, which suggests that directors share more information about tax 
minimization opportunities than activities that produce consistent tax outcomes. 
To examine the relative importance of managerial incentives and practices in 
determining the primary focus of firms’ tax strategies, I include proxies for equity incentives, 
expert tax advice, and information transferred through directorships in the analysis 
simultaneously.  My results are comparable to those of the individual tests (i.e., all variables of 
interest retain the same sign and level of significance).  I compare the relative importance of the 
factors using fully standardized coefficients and find that the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to 
changes in the stock price is more important than information transfer to the decision to 
emphasize sustainability.  Firms that focus on minimization are influenced most by equity 
incentives (vega), followed by expert tax advice, and finally, information from directors’ 
connections.  My results suggest that, in general, equity incentives are not only associated with 
observed tax outcomes, as documented in the prior literature, but more importantly, represent the 
most important determinants of the tax strategy choice which produces the observed tax 
outcomes examined by prior research.   
In addition to my main analysis, I conduct a number of additional tests.  First, to more 
directly control for the influence of tax planning opportunities on firms’ tax strategy choices, I 
replicate my results using a sample of sustainable and minimization tax strategy firms matched 
on size within industry and year and find that managerial incentives and practices continue to be 
significant determinants of firms’ tax strategy choices.  Second, consistent with the notion that 
either tax strategy can be value-maximizing, I find that firms that choose either a sustainable or a 
minimization tax strategy have significantly higher current and future market value of equity 
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relative to other firms without an explicit, observable tax strategy.  Because firms’ tax strategy 
choices are relatively stationary over time, I also investigate the association between firms’ 
future tax strategy choices and current period managerial incentives and practices.  My 
inferences are consistent with my main analysis and suggest that current period incentives and 
practices influence the choice of tax strategy one, two, and four years in the future.  Furthermore, 
when I re-estimate my regressions after defining tax strategy using GAAP ETRs, my results with 
respect to expert tax advice and information transfer are unchanged.  However, although my 
inferences with respect to equity incentives are similar (i.e., the sign of the coefficients is in the 
same direction), my results are attenuated because the coefficients are no longer significant at 
conventional levels.   
The focus of my study is the two distinct tax strategies, sustainability and minimization; 
however, I also examine two other sets of firms.  First, I investigate firms that follow a mixed tax 
strategy (i.e., firms that do not emphasize either sustainability or minimization).  Using a 
multinomial logistic regression, I find that the effect of managerial incentives and practices on 
the choice of a mixed tax strategy falls near the middle of the effect of these factors for the 
choice of a sustainable or minimization tax strategy, consistent with this tax strategy 
incorporating elements of both sustainability and minimization.  In addition, I also examine the 
small sample of firms that emphasize both sustainability and minimization.  Although based on a 
limited number of observations, my results suggest that, not only do these firms have the 
resources and capabilities to focus on both tax strategies, but they also employ the incentives and 
practices necessary to encourage managers to focus on both dimensions of tax strategy, a 
combination that seems to allow them to simultaneously emphasize sustainability and 
minimization.     
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This study makes three contributions to the literature.  First, I extend the literature that 
examines the determinants of corporate tax avoidance by investigating firms’ choice of tax 
strategy, by providing evidence that managerial incentives and practices are associated with 
firms’ tax strategy choices, and by examining the relative importance of these factors for the 
choice of tax strategy.  This study improves our understanding of the determinants of tax strategy 
(e.g., firm characteristics, performance factors, and managerial incentives/practices), which is 
important because researchers know relatively little about what influences firms’ tax strategy 
choices.  Although the prior literature has investigated some of these characteristics and their 
association with tax avoidance and tax sheltering activities, it has not analyzed these 
incentives/practices in the context of how they influence the tax strategy choice, a decision that 
precedes observed tax outcomes and cannot necessarily be inferred from tax outcomes alone, nor 
has it considered sustainable and minimization tax strategies in conjunction with one another.     
Second, despite prior literature’s identification of numerous factors and firm 
characteristics that are associated with firms’ tax avoidance, little of the variation in tax 
outcomes has been explained (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Shevlin 2007).  A firm’s tax outcome 
depends on its tax strategy, and thus, by classifying firms based on tax strategy and identifying 
managerial incentives and practices that affect tax strategy choice, this study provides an 
additional explanation for the variation in tax outcomes observed across firms, as well as 
develops expectations regarding the tax strategy that firms are likely to employ.  Finally, by 
identifying managerial incentives and practices associated with the choice of tax strategy, this 
study provides insight into how firms encourage tax planning that improves firm value.     
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2. BACKGROUND ON TAX STRATEGY AND ITS DIMENSIONS  
 
 Tax strategy can be defined as a pattern of decision-making and actions with respect to 
tax planning that maximizes after-tax returns and firm value (Scholes et al. 2009).  By examining 
the variation in tax outcomes and the determinants and consequences of tax avoidance (see 
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) for a review of the recent literature), prior research has sought to 
explain observed tax outcomes (e.g., ETRs, book-tax differences, the incidence of tax 
sheltering).  In contrast, this study examines firms’ tax decisions from a different perspective.  
The purpose of this study is to investigate the managerial incentives and practices associated 
with firms’ tax strategy choices.  The choice of tax strategy is a higher-level decision that 
precedes and primarily determines firms’ observed tax outcomes; thus, this study extends prior 
research by examining the determinants of the underlying tax strategy.      
 Because the goal of any strategy can be achieved using a variety of approaches, all firm 
strategies have several dimensions (Hambrick 1983; Miller 1987; Porter 2004; Zahra and Covin 
1993).  For example, Miles and Snow (1978) suggest that firms tend to follow one of two 
primary approaches to business strategy – an innovation approach or an efficiency approach.  
Both methods allow firms to successfully compete in their product markets, but the two 
production models differ.  Porter (2004) indicates that managers choose a strategy based upon 
the firm’s situation and its strengths and weaknesses.  Thus, any dimension of a strategy can be 
value-maximizing, but managers make trade-offs between the dimensions to implement the 
strategy that best suits the firm and its situation (Hambrick 1983; March 1991; Porter 2004).   
 The Scholes-Wolfson framework argues that, because of non-tax costs, effective tax 
planning is not always achieved by focusing solely on tax minimization (Scholes et al. 2009), 
and prior research supports this argument.  Specifically, Dyreng et al. (2008) indicate that tax 
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avoidance does not always improve market value because the reduction of explicit taxes may be 
accompanied by implicit taxes (i.e., non-tax costs), implying that there are considerations that 
could lead firms to focus on a tax objective other than minimization.  Similarly, Robinson et al. 
(2010) acknowledge that lower ETRs do not always imply effective tax planning, and Phillips 
(2003) indicates that a low ETR represents tax savings, but does not necessarily indicate that 
after-tax returns have been maximized.  Furthermore, although there are a number of firms that 
achieve substantial tax avoidance (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2008), many firms reduce their tax burdens 
by relatively small amounts.  Collectively, the prior literature provides a strong basis for the 
conclusion that, similar to other firm strategies, there are multiple tax strategies that can 
successfully improve after-tax returns and firm value. 
 The strategy literature consistently classifies firms into typologies by identifying the 
most salient observable strategies.  Although every strategy will not be represented by the 
classifications, they predict organizational behavior with reasonable accuracy (Miles et al. 1978).  
Consistent with this approach, I chose to focus on sustainability and minimization because these 
the most common dimensions of tax strategy, firms following either strategy are readily 
identifiable, and the two strategies are observable both empirically and in discussions offered in 
the practitioners’ literature.  An emphasis on a sustainable tax strategy is likely when firms use 
recurring tax planning techniques to achieve consistent tax outcomes over time.  These firms are 
mindful of the variability of tax outcomes, but potentially have less regard for the tax outcome’s 
level (McGuire et al. 2013; Neuman et al. 2013).  Firms emphasizing sustainability will 
primarily pursue long-term tax avoidance activities with more predictable tax outcomes (e.g., 
cost recovery for purchases of capital equipment and unrepatriated earnings from foreign 
operations in stable countries with well-documented tax laws).  In contrast, an emphasis on a 
minimization tax strategy is likely when firms focus on achieving the lowest possible tax 
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outcome using a combination of recurring and one-time tax planning opportunities (Mills et al. 
1998).  These firms are more concerned about the level of the current year’s tax outcome than 
about being consistent with the surrounding years’ outcomes.  Firms emphasizing minimization 
will pursue a much wider range of tax avoidance activities – long-term and short-term tax 
avoidance activities with both predictable and less certain tax outcomes (e.g., cost recovery on 
purchases of capital equipment, unrepatriated earnings from a wide variety of foreign operations, 
research and experimentation tax credits, and transfer pricing).      
 Empirical and anecdotal evidence is consistent with the existence of both sustainable and 
minimization tax strategies.  With respect to sustainability, Mills (1998) and Mills and Newberry 
(2001) provide evidence indicating that firms must balance tax avoidance and financial reporting 
costs.  Furthermore, prior research and survey evidence indicate that firms prefer to avoid tax-
related surprises (Schmidt 2006; Armstrong et al. 2012; TEI 2005), and concurrent research 
finds that some firms are able to sustain their tax outcomes over the long-term (e.g., McGuire et 
al. 2013; Neuman et al. 2013).  Finally, practitioners advertise tax planning activities with 
sustainable outcomes because they suggest that such tax strategies increase long-term value 
(Strategic Capital Partners, LLC 2012; Deloitte LLP 2013; KPMG LLP 2007; PwC 2008).  
However, prior research also confirms the existence of minimization tax strategies by suggesting 
that managers are often incentivized to focus on reducing tax outcomes (Phillips 2003; Robinson 
et al. 2010; Armstrong et al. 2012) because it increases income and, in some instances, 
encourages behavior that mitigates other incentive problems (Scholes et al. 2009).  Ayers et al. 
(2009) also indicate that many firms benefit from deferring taxes.  Finally, there is substantial 
evidence that some firms are able to achieve low ETRs (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2008; Schumpeter 
2012; Kocieniewski 2011; Duhigg and Kocieniewski 2012), implying that tax minimization may 
be optimal for some firms.      
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 There are costs and benefits associated with both sustainability and minimization.  Firms 
focusing on sustainability experience low year-to-year variability in tax outcomes (Deloitte LLP 
2013; KPMG LLP 2007; PwC 2008) and are less likely to have tax-related earnings surprises 
(Armstrong et al. 2012; Schmidt 2006; TEI 2005) and/or unfavorable financial reporting effects 
(Mills 1998; Scholes et al. 2009).  These firms also have less volatile and more persistent 
earnings (McGuire et al. 2013), which improves firm value due to their predictable, consistent 
earnings’ strings (e.g., Barth et al. 1999; DeAngelo et al. 1996; Kasznik and McNichols 2002; 
Mills and Newberry 2001; Myers et al. 2007).  Sustainable tax strategies may also be preferred 
by some firms because Graham et al. (2005) find that 97 percent of CFO survey respondents 
desire smooth earnings, which investors view as less risky.  Fewer earnings surprises and 
unfavorable financial reporting effects and higher earnings persistence have all been linked to 
improved firm values (see Dechow et al. 2010 for a review of the literature), but practitioners’ 
most advertised reason for adopting a sustainable tax strategy is reputation costs (Deloitte LLP 
2013; KPMG LLP 2007; PwC 2008).  These tax strategies reduce firms’ exposure to negative 
press related to tax planning issues (Deloitte LLP 2013), which can be a significant concern for 
firms (Graham et al. 2013; Hanlon and Slemrod 2009).  However, emphasizing a sustainable tax 
strategy is not without costs.  Firms with sustainable tax strategies could, by investing in tax 
planning that produces more predictable outcomes, be paying more tax than legally owed 
(Deloitte LLP 2013; McGuire et al. 2013; TEI 2005), reducing cash available for investment.7  
Furthermore, once this strategy has been established, these firms may also face greater pressure 
to maintain consistent outcomes because sudden volatility could be viewed as a signal of poor 
management (KPMG LLP 2007). 
                                                 
7 On average, firms following sustainable tax strategies in my sample pay higher taxes than firms 
following minimization tax strategies (average three-year cash ETR of 28.7 percent versus 11 percent).    
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 Firms emphasizing minimization benefit from the increased income and cash flow 
associated with a lower explicit tax burden (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Maydew 1996; Mills 
1998; Phillips 2003).  Rather than being paid out as tax expense, cash taxes saved represents 
additional cash flow that can be invested in positive net present value projects (Armstrong et al. 
2012; Ayers et al. 2009; Schumpeter 2012), increasing firm value.  These firms will be less 
concerned about the risk or variability of any tax activity’s expected outcome, as well as the 
length of time the tax avoidance opportunity will exist; thus, they draw upon a wider range of tax 
planning activities.  However, there are several potential costs of the minimization tax strategy.  
Low ETRs increase the risk of audit by revenue authorities, which potentially results in penalties 
and fines for disallowed tax avoidance that could negate the original tax benefit (Ayers et al. 
2009; Cloyd 1995; Cloyd et al. 1996; Mills 1998; Mills and Sansing 2000; Schumpeter 2012).  
Scholes et al. (2009) also warn that a minimization tax strategy can become an ineffective tax 
strategy if non-tax costs are not fully considered (Deloitte LLP 2013; Mills and Newberry 2001; 
Phillips 2003).  Finally, tax minimization can create significant reputation costs.  The idea of 
being a good corporate citizen, particularly with respect to taxes, became more salient during the 
latest recessionary period (Deloitte LLP 2013; Hanlon and Slemrod 2009), leading firms to seek 
to avoid negative attention, and detrimental consequences, related to their tax strategies (Graham 
et al. 2013).  For example, Cook et al. (2014) show that tax avoidance perceived as aggressive is 
associated with higher costs of capital, and Starbucks found the backlash to its legitimate tax 
avoidance in the U.K. so harmful to sales that it announced that the company will forgo claiming 
an allowed deduction and pay $30.8 million in taxes in 2013 and 2014 (BBC 2013).  Because 
each tax strategy has costs and benefits, managers must consider these trade-offs, in conjunction 
with their firm’s unique circumstances, to choose the appropriate value-maximizing tax strategy.   
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I expect firms to emphasize one tax strategy because the strategy literature provides 
evidence that it is difficult, if not impossible, for a firm to simultaneously focus on two 
dimensions of a strategy (March 1991).  Firms’ stakeholders will implement policies and 
managers will take actions that depend on the dimension of a strategy that is being pursued (e.g., 
Miles and Snow 1978).  The set of viable policies and actions for each dimension of a strategy 
are unlikely to have substantial overlap, which generally prohibits emphasizing multiple 
dimensions simultaneously.  Therefore, based on the prior literature; the different costs and 
benefits of each tax strategy; and the different tax planning actions associated with each 
dimension of tax strategy, I expect firms to emphasize either a sustainable or minimization tax 
strategy and to seldom have the capability to emphasize both dimensions of tax strategy.8 
   
                                                 
8 Within my sample, there are some firms that are able to emphasize both sustainability and minimization; 
however, consistent with the prior literature, it is very small sample (187 observations).  In section 6, I 
conduct additional analyses using this subsample to provide insights into how these firms might be able to 
focus on both dimensions of tax strategy simultaneously.       
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3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
 Because shareholders’ and managers’ interests often do not align, managerial incentives 
and practices are used to ensure that the stewards of the firm make decisions in a manner that is 
consistent with stakeholders’ interests (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  The choice of tax strategy is 
likely influenced by these factors because their purpose is to affect decision-making.  Prior 
research supports this notion.  Dyreng et al. (2008) argue that management’s actions determine a 
firm’s tax strategy, and Mills et al. (1998) assert that investments in tax planning, and thus tax 
strategy, will vary due to management’s incentives and practices.  Therefore, in this study, I 
examine three managerial incentives and practices –providing equity incentives to executives, 
obtaining expert tax advice, and transferring information through directorships – and their 
association with firms’ tax strategy choices.9     
3.1 Equity Incentives    
According to principal-agent theory, shareholders structure compensation contracts and 
employ incentives to link managers’ wealth to firm performance, thereby aligning the agent’s 
interests with the principal’s (Diamond and Verrecchia 1982; Holmstrom 1979; Jensen and 
Meckling 1976).  Core and Guay (1999) find that, in general, firms provide equity incentives in a 
manner that matches the predictions of optimal contracting, suggesting that incentives are given 
to target agency conflicts and influence decision-making.  Firms manage and rely primarily on 
two types of equity incentives – the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to stock price or firm 
performance (commonly referred to as delta) and the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to stock 
                                                 
9 While firm characteristics (e.g., business structure, assets, resources) will undoubtedly influence 
available tax planning opportunities, I focus on equity incentives, expert tax advice, and information 
transfer because this study’s objective is to explore factors beyond a firm’s innate characteristics that 
affect tax strategy choice.  I include a vector of control variables to account for the impact of firm 
characteristics on tax strategy choice.      
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return volatility or variability in firm performance (commonly referred to as vega).  When a 
manager’s wealth depends on firm performance, the manager is incentivized to increase the 
firm’s stock price (Guay 1999).  However, by also compensating the manager for stock return 
volatility (vega), shareholders can encourage decision-making that promotes engaging in all 
positive net present value projects, even more risky investments and policies (e.g., Chava and 
Purnanandam 2010; Coles et al. 2006; Guay 1999).   
 Managerial incentives represent an important factor for the choice of tax strategy 
because the compensation contract informs the manager about the amount of effort that should 
be devoted to tax planning (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Slemrod 2004) and the type of tax 
planning (i.e., strategy) shareholders desire (Armstrong et al. 2012; Phillips 2003; Rego and 
Wilson 2012).10  Because tax strategy contributes to firms’ profitability (Scholes et al. 2009), 
shareholders value tax planning; therefore, managerial incentives will align the interests of 
managers and shareholders with respect to tax strategy decisions (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010).  
Prior research supports this assertion and concludes that equity incentives and compensation are 
associated with firms’ tax avoidance (Armstrong et al. 2012; Desai and Dharmapala 2006; 
Phillips 2003; Rego and Wilson 2012).  In addition, Robinson et al. (2010) find that a firm’s 
GAAP ETR depends on the performance evaluation metric used for the tax department, and 
Powers et al. (2013) find that CEOs with cash bonuses tied to after-tax performance targets 
report lower GAAP ETRs than CEOs with pre-tax performance targets, indicating that specific 
details of managers’ compensation contracts are associated with tax avoidance.  Because equity 
                                                 
10 I am not suggesting that the compensation contract explicitly states which tax strategy to choose or the 
portion of the executive’s time that should be devoted to tax planning.  However, the contract will provide 
information about the activities shareholders value most, as well as the executive’s evaluation metrics, 
some of which are likely after-tax values (e.g., Phillips 2003; Robinson et al. 2010).  Thus, the 
compensation contract will influence the manager’s tax strategy choice as he aligns his decision-making 
with his incentives to maximize his wealth.    
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incentives are designed to impact decision-making, I expect that managers’ wealth sensitivity to 
firm performance or stock return volatility is associated with tax strategy choice.   
 The objective of increasing the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to changes in the 
stock price (delta) is to encourage the manager to improve firm value by raising the stock price.  
There are a number of aspects of firm performance or earnings quality linked to higher stock 
prices, but one aspect, earnings persistence, has been shown to be associated with sustainability.  
In general, firms with more persistent or predictable earnings exhibit higher stock prices (e.g., 
Barth et al. 1999; DeAngelo et al. 1996; Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Myers et al. 2007), and 
firms with more sustainable tax strategies exhibit more persistent earnings (McGuire et al. 2013), 
which suggests this type of tax strategy is related to higher firm performance.  Furthermore, risk-
averse managers will invest in projects with more predictable outcomes (Smith and Stulz 1985); 
therefore, if managers are incentivized to increase the stock price, they may be more likely to 
emphasize sustainability.  Thus, I expect the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to changes in 
the stock price (delta) to increase the likelihood that a firm engages in a sustainable tax strategy.   
Compensating the manager for improving firm performance reduces some agency 
conflicts; however, risk-averse managers will avoid investing in risky, but valuable projects 
(Smith and Stulz 1985).  Thus, shareholders may choose to supplement these incentives with 
equity incentives that increase the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to stock return volatility 
(vega) to encourage broader investment preferences (e.g., Guay 1999).  As compensation for 
stock return volatility increases, the manager will be more inclined to balance investment in 
projects with more predictable outcomes and cash flows with investment in relatively more risky 
opportunities.   
I expect a shift in incentive structure that encourages risk-taking to increase the 
likelihood that a firm emphasizes a minimization tax strategy rather than a sustainable tax 
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strategy for several reasons.  First, firms focusing on sustainability are less likely to engage in 
risky activities (Deloitte LLP 2013); however, a minimization tax strategy will likely require the 
manager to undertake risky tax avoidance activities – activities that are either aggressive (Desai 
and Dharmapala 2006; Hanlon et al. 2007; Rego and Wilson 2012) or less likely to be upheld by 
the taxing authority – which lead to more volatile tax outcomes, and ultimately, stock returns.  In 
addition, Guenther et al. (2013) find that firms with more volatile cash ETRs have higher future 
stock return volatility, suggesting that stock return volatility may be negatively associated with 
sustainability and that managers of firms with sustainable tax strategies are unlikely to be 
rewarded for volatile stock returns.  However, Rego and Wilson (2012) find that the sensitivity 
of the manager’s wealth to stock return volatility is associated with tax avoidance, suggesting a 
positive relation between incentives to engage in riskier activities and minimization.  Thus, I 
expect the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to stock return volatility (vega) to increase the 
likelihood that a firm engages in a minimization tax strategy. 
Collectively, I expect equity incentives to influence the likelihood of choosing a 
particular tax strategy and state the following hypothesis:   
 H1: A firm will be more likely to implement a sustainable tax strategy (minimization tax 
strategy) as its managers’ wealth becomes more sensitive to changes in stock price 
(stock return volatility).  
 
3.2 Managerial Practices 
Managerial incentives are an important decision-making factor because they are used to 
align shareholders’ and managers’ interests and encourage certain types of decisions, and thus 
are likely associated with tax strategy choice.  However, managerial practices may also be 
influential for the choice of tax strategy because these practices represent sources of information 
that may be helpful for implementing a strategy.  In this study, I specifically examine two 
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potential sources of tax planning information – expert tax advice and information transferred 
among directors.  I discuss each managerial practice below.    
3.2.1 Expert Tax Advice 
One source of tax planning information is the professional advice of tax experts.  
Organizational behaviorists define professional advice as a recommendation that “could help 
decision-makers make better decisions and avoid mistakes, help them think about new 
information, [and] help them organize their thoughts” (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006, 143).  Because 
of the complex nature of tax planning, managers may consult tax experts for advice prior to 
implementing a tax strategy.  Theory and prior research suggest that decision-makers solicit 
advice to improve the likelihood of making an optimal decision, particularly when they do not 
have prior experience with the decision or activities it involves (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006; 
Harvey and Fischer 1997; Yaniv 2004a, b).  Managers will be keenly familiar with the firm’s 
business, but may not have extensive tax planning experience.  However, tax experts possess 
superior knowledge of industry-specific tax avoidance techniques, as well as general tax 
planning opportunities (McGuire et al. 2012), and are likely to offer the most recent innovations 
in tax planning, which can improve their clients’ abilities to develop effective strategies to 
generate tax savings (Deloitte Development LLC 2013; Ernst & Young 2013; PwC 2013).   
Tax fees comprise a substantial percentage of accounting firm revenue (Zeff 2003; 
Public Accounting Report 2008), and tax planning is a large portion of the services that tax 
practitioners provide.  Therefore, expert tax advice could facilitate the client’s choice of an 
effective tax strategy because accounting firms invest in training and knowledge to develop tax 
plans for their clients (Solomon et al. 1999; Ferguson et al. 2003).  Consistent with this notion, 
studies have shown that employing professional advice improves decision accuracy (Gardner 
and Berry 1995; Sniezek et al. 2004; Yaniv 2004a) and that high quality advice from solicited, 
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expert sources is more likely to be implemented than other types of advice (Jungerman and 
Fischer 2005; Jungermann 1999; Yaniv and Kleinberger 2000; Yaniv and Milyavsy 2007; Gino 
2008; Gibbons et al. 2003).  Therefore, because of the potential benefits of their specialized 
knowledge, I expect that obtaining professional advice from tax experts is a managerial practice 
associated with the choice of tax strategy. 
Ex ante, obtaining expert tax advice could be associated with the choice of either a 
sustainable or a minimization tax strategy.  The managers of a firm with a sustainable tax 
strategy take advantage of more predictable tax avoidance opportunities (Deloitte LLP 2013) and 
have the ability to control and forecast operations and income (McGuire et al. 2013; Neuman et 
al. 2013), which allows them to engage in long-run tax planning (Schmidt 2006).  Although 
these firms are less interested in innovative tax avoidance activities, they will seek information 
about recurring tax avoidance activities that have been consistently upheld by the taxing 
authority.  It is conceivable that tax experts are a source of this type of information because 
practitioners market tax strategies with sustainable outcomes (Strategic Capital Partners, LLC 
2012; Deloitte LLP 2013; KPMG LLP 2007; PwC 2008).  Thus, if the information that tax 
experts provide improves firms’ abilities to implement a tax strategy that generates consistent tax 
outcomes through recurring, long-term tax avoidance activities, then I expect that hiring a tax 
expert audit firm for tax services is associated with a higher likelihood of adopting a sustainable 
tax strategy.   
In contrast to firms emphasizing sustainability, to employ a minimization tax strategy, 
managers must engage in all feasible tax planning opportunities, which increases the value of 
information on the latest tax law changes, new tax planning techniques, and industry-specific tax 
avoidance activities.  Tax experts are key sources of this type of information (Deloitte 
Development LLC 2013; Ernst & Young 2013; PwC 2013).  Because it is costly and difficult for 
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managers to individually obtain the information necessary to minimize taxes (Bonner et al. 1992; 
Deloitte Development LLC 2013; Ernst & Young 2013; McGuire et al. 2012; SD Mayer & 
Associates LLP 2013), firms implementing a minimization tax strategy may find the specialized 
knowledge of tax experts beneficial.  Furthermore, McGuire et al. (2012) find that firms that hire 
their tax expert audit firm for tax services avoid more taxes on average, indicating that experts 
reduce tax outcomes and implying that expert tax advice could facilitate minimization.  Thus, 
hiring a tax expert audit firm for tax services may also be associated with a higher likelihood of 
choosing a minimization tax strategy. 
Accounting firms advertise a number of tax planning opportunities, and tax experts can 
provide information that would contribute to a firm’s ability to engage in either a sustainable or 
minimization tax strategy.  Thus, depending on the relative amounts of information tax experts 
provide about the two tax strategies, it is possible that obtaining expert tax advice increases the 
likelihood of choosing either tax strategy.  Therefore, I state the following hypothesis:        
 H2: Hiring a tax expert audit firm for tax services will influence a firm’s choice of tax 
strategy.  
 
3.2.2 Information Transfer among Directors 
A second source of tax planning information is information transferred among firms’ 
directors.  Relationships among firms’ directors form an extensive network across which 
information that may contribute to firm behavior or decision-making can be shared.  Indeed, 
social network theory emphasizes the importance of relationships among individuals for 
observed behavior, both at an individual and an entity level (Borgatti and Halgin 2011; Phelps et 
al. 2012).  The interactions among firms’ directors may influence strategy choices because 
Borgatti and Halgin (2011) suggest that the primary function of a network is to transfer 
information and that members’ behavior is often a function of network placement because of its 
impact on the amount and timeliness of information received.  To model the interactions among 
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individuals, social network analysis uses networks to map the connections of individuals or 
entities within a particular system (Haythornthwaite 1996; Krause et al. 2007; Newman 2010).11  
Specifically, the technique of social network analysis has been used to examine the availability 
and transfer of resources, ideas, innovations, and information across members of a network (e.g., 
Haythornthwaite 1996, 2009; Scott 1991; Wasserman and Faust 1994; Wellman and Berkowitz 
1988), including networks of directors (e.g., Andres and Lehmann 2010; Barnea and Guedj 
2009; Davis et al. 2003; Horton et al. 2012; Larcker et al. 2013; Omer et al. 2012, 2014).     
Prior research suggests that information transferred among directors could affect firms’ 
tax strategy choices.  For example, there is evidence consistent with both value-increasing (e.g., 
Gulati and Westphal 1999; Haunschild 1993; Palmer et al. 1986; Palmer et al. 1989) and value-
decreasing (e.g., Bizjak et al. 2009; Dooley 1969; Pennings 1980) corporate policies traveling 
across firms through directors’ connections.  These studies demonstrate that firms are more 
likely to implement a policy or strategy found at another firm when there are connections among 
the directors.  Because information related to a wide range of corporate policies and strategies 
flows from one firm to the next via directors’ interactions, tax planning information is likely to 
travel in a similar manner.  Consistent with this notion, prior research finds that tax shelters 
spread across firms via interlocking directors (Brown 2011), firms with board interlocks tend to 
pay a similar level of tax (Brown and Drake 2013), and firms avoid more taxes when the audit 
committee has higher levels of financial expertise (Robinson et al. 2012).  Furthermore, tax 
directors meet regularly with the board, particularly the audit committee, to discuss tax planning 
(ATA 2014), indicating that directors have direct communication with the individuals 
responsible for implementing tax strategy.  Thus, anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that 
                                                 
11 There are many possible definitions of a link between individuals within a network – professional 
relationships, communication, information flow, etc. (Newman 2010); however, in this study, I focus on 
information transfer. 
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directors share tax planning information which may influence tax strategy choice.  Finally, 
effective tax planning cannot be accomplished without adequate knowledge of available tax 
planning opportunities and, given the significant cost of identifying tax planning activities (e.g., 
Deloitte Development LLC 2013; Ernst & Young 2013; SD Mayer & Associates LLP 2013), 
firms may consult each other for tax planning information to improve efficiency.  While it is 
unlikely that directors themselves have the technical tax expertise to explain a tax planning 
technique or tax strategy, they can share tax planning information by introducing their peers to 
the individual or entity responsible for their tax strategy.  Thus, based upon the prior literature, I 
expect information transferred through directors’ connections to be associated with the choice of 
tax strategy. 
 Ex ante, information transferred through directors’ connections could be associated with 
the choice of either a sustainable or a minimization tax strategy.  To achieve consistent tax 
outcomes, the managers of firms with sustainable tax strategies invest in recurring tax avoidance 
activities that are more likely to be sustained upon audit (Deloitte LLP 2013).  Implementing a 
long-term tax strategy with recurring tax avoidance activities is complex; however, if directors 
receive information identifying tax planning opportunities previously upheld by the taxing 
authority, then tax planning information available through directors’ connections to other firms 
may be useful for maintaining a sustainable tax strategy.  Directors could be a source of this type 
of information because a number of firms exhibit more sustainable tax outcomes (McGuire et al. 
2013), suggesting that some directors have knowledge of these tax strategies, and many 
accounting firms, which directors may have done business with, market sustainable tax strategies 
(Deloitte LLP 2013; KPMG LLP 2007; PwC 2008).  Thus, I expect that information transferred 
through directors’ connections increases the likelihood that a firm adopts a sustainable tax 
strategy.   
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In contrast, firms focusing on minimization are expected to employ all available tax 
avoidance mechanisms, which would require information about new tax planning opportunities 
or the tax avoidance activities being used by their peers and competitors.  Directors are likely 
sources of information related to tax minimization because Brown (2011) shows that board 
interlocks are associated with specific transactions (i.e., tax shelters) whose goal is to minimize 
taxes.  Therefore, prior research indicates that directors’ connections, and the information 
obtained through those connections, may be an important determinant of focusing on a 
minimization tax strategy.  Therefore, I expect information transferred through directors’ 
connections could also increase the likelihood that a firm chooses a minimization tax strategy. 
Directors have access to different types of tax planning information through their 
connections to other firms.  This information is likely a combination of innovative tax planning 
opportunities and more predictable tax avoidance activities.  Thus, depending on the relative 
amounts of these two types of information, it is possible that information transferred through 
directors’ connections increases the likelihood of choosing either tax strategy.  Therefore, I 
hypothesize that:     
 H3: The information transferred to a firm through its directors’ connections will 
influence a firm’s choice of tax strategy.  
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
4.1 Sample Selection 
To investigate my hypotheses, I obtain a sample of firm-year observations at the 
intersection of the Compstat, CRSP, Execucomp, Audit Analytics, and Risk Metrics databases 
from 2000-2010.  Consistent with prior literature, all firms in the sample are incorporated in the 
U.S., have total assets greater than zero and positive pre-tax book income in the current year, and 
do not operate in the financial services or utilities sectors.12  In addition, I require that the 
observations have non-missing data for cash taxes paid and pre-tax book income for three of the 
five years necessary to calculate sustainability.  Finally, to maintain a consistent sample, I 
exclude firm-year observations that lack the data necessary to calculate any of the variables used 
in the analysis – the tax strategy variables, variables of interest, or controls.  My final sample 
consists of 4,668 firm-year observations (1,137 unique firms).   
4.2 Description of Variables  
Following prior research, I define a sustainable tax strategy as a tax strategy that 
achieves a consistent tax outcome over time (i.e., a narrow range of ETRs), regardless of the tax 
outcome’s level (e.g., McGuire et al. 2013; Neuman et al. 2013), and a minimization tax strategy 
as a tax strategy that focuses on obtaining the lowest possible tax outcome (e.g., Dyreng et al. 
2008; Scholes et al. 2009).  Firms’ tax strategies are defined in terms of a goal for long-term tax 
outcomes; thus, to isolate firms’ tax strategies, I examine their behavior, and the resulting tax 
outcomes, over time.  Specifically, I operationalize tax strategy using the distribution of 
observed tax characteristics and identify firms that consistently demonstrate tax behavior that is 
                                                 
12 I remove financial services and utilities firms from the sample due to differences in their accounting 
requirements.  
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representative of the two dimensions of tax strategy.  My approach of using observable tax 
outcomes measured over a period of time to infer firms’ unobservable tax strategies is consistent 
with the methodology of empirical analyses of business strategy (e.g., Bentley et al. 2012; 
Higgins et al. 2014) in which firm characteristics derived from financial statement data are used 
to operationalize unobservable business strategy.       
I classify firms as following a sustainable tax strategy using the coefficient of variation 
of annual cash ETRs (CV_CETR) measured over the five-year period, t to t-4, following 
McGuire et al. (2013).  CV_CETR is calculated as the standard deviation of annual cash ETRs 
scaled by the absolute value of the mean of annual cash ETRs and measures the variability in a 
firm’s tax outcome level over the five-year period.  Firms with low variability maintain a 
consistent range of cash ETRs over time; thus, I define a sustainable tax strategy using 
CV_CETR (McGuire et al. 2013).  Specifically, I rank firms by year according to CV_CETR, and 
a firm is categorized as following a sustainable tax strategy if its coefficient of variation is in the 
lowest quintile for the year.13  Thus, SUSTAIN equals one if a firm’s tax outcomes exhibit low 
variability over time, and zero otherwise.  Coca-Cola, Conoco-Phillips, Kimberley-Clark, and 
United Parcel Service are examples of firms in my sample that focus on sustainability.        
 I classify firms as following a minimization tax strategy using the cash ETR measured 
over the three-year period, t to t-2, following Dyreng et al. (2008).14  The three-year cash ETR 
                                                 
13 Because firms classified as following a sustainable tax strategy will vary with the underlying population, 
I define SUSTAIN using all available observations with data necessary to calculate CV_CETR.  This 
method ensures that I am examining firms that have consistent tax outcomes relative to the larger 
population of firms.  
 
14 I measure minimization over a three-year period for two reasons.  First, I use a three-year measure rather 
than an annual measure to control for the annual volatility of ETRs and measure the firm’s tax strategy 
over time.  Second, I use a three-year period rather than a five-year period because Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) argue that most firm operations, and the associated cash flows, complete their accounting cycle 
within a three-year period.  I use a five-year period to estimate CV_CETR to be consistent with prior 
literature that calculates coefficients of variation (e.g., Minton and Schrand 1999; Minton et al. 2002).  My 
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(CETR3) equals the three-year sum of cash taxes paid divided by the three-year sum of pre-tax 
book income less special items and measures the average tax outcome over the three-year period.  
Firms with low cash ETRs are able to achieve a relatively high level of tax avoidance over time; 
thus, I define a minimization tax strategy using CETR3 (Dyreng et al. 2008).  Specifically, a firm 
is categorized as following a minimization tax strategy if its three-year cash ETR is less than or 
equal to 20 percent.15  Thus, MINIMIZE equals one if a firm reports low tax outcomes over time, 
and zero otherwise.  Apple, Eli Lilly, International Paper, and PeopleSoft are several firms in my 
sample that emphasize minimization.  Please see Appendix A for detailed examples of firms 
identified as following either a sustainable or minimization tax strategy.16   
 I measure tax strategies using cash ETRs for several reasons.  First, firms’ tax strategies 
will ultimately be reflected in the cash paid to taxing authorities.  Hanlon et al. (2005) indicate 
that firms have more discretion over the calculation of financial statement income than taxable 
income; thus, while ETRs based upon financial statement income may suggest that a firm has 
adopted a particular tax strategy, the cash paid to taxing authorities is likely more representative 
of the tax strategy in place, as well as the firm’s execution of that strategy.  Second, GAAP 
ETRs and cash ETRs capture different aspects of tax planning.  For example, GAAP ETRs are 
not affected by tax activities that defer taxes, but changes in the tax accruals (i.e., the valuation 
allowance or the tax reserve) will affect GAAP ETR.  On the other hand, cash ETRs take into 
account tax activities that defer taxes and are unaffected by changes in tax accruals (Hanlon and 
Heitzman 2010).  Therefore, because cash ETRs are a more comprehensive measure of tax 
                                                                                                                                                
inferences are unchanged when I use the five-year cash ETR to identify firms that emphasize minimization 
(please see Section 7 for a discussion of this additional analysis).    
 
15 I define the minimization tax strategy as a CETR3 less than or equal to 20 percent because Dyreng et al. 
(2008) define low tax rate firms as those with a rate of 20 percent or less (p. 62). 
 
16 See Appendix B for detailed definitions of all variables used in this study. 
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planning activities (i.e., temporary and permanent differences) that are not impacted by the 
judgment inherent in the tax accrual process, I operationalize firms’ tax strategies using cash 
ETRs.17      
4.3 Method  
 The two dimensions of tax strategy are not independent.  Because a firm cannot 
simultaneously emphasize both tax strategies, but both tax strategies are potentially available to 
the firm, the decision to concentrate on sustainability cannot be separated from the decision to 
concentrate on minimization.18  Thus, the choice of tax strategy represents a situation in which 
the probabilities of choice directly affect one another and are endogenous (Mallar 1977).  
Therefore, the error terms of the models of these two choices are dependent upon one another, 
and the probability of adopting one tax strategy must be estimated assuming a joint distribution 
of both tax strategy choices (Woolridge 2010, 595-6).  To control for the interdependence of this 
choice, I employ seemingly unrelated bivariate probit regression to identify which managerial 
incentives and practices are associated with a higher likelihood of emphasizing a sustainable or 
minimization tax strategy.   
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit regression is a simultaneous probability model, an 
analysis that models binary relationships whose probability of occurrence influences the 
probability of another event or decision (Mallar 1977).19  This model is analogous to a seemingly 
                                                 
17 Cash ETRs are not perfect measures of firms’ tax activities; for instance, they are affected by stock 
option expensing.  Thus, I examine the sensitivity of my results to measuring tax strategy using GAAP 
ETRs.  My inferences, presented in Section 6, are similar using this alternative classification.     
 
18 The strategy literature suggests that it is difficult, if not impossible, for a firm to focus on two 
dimensions of a strategy at once (March 1991).  
 
19 I use this technique because neither Stata nor SAS have a program that permits estimating logistic 
regressions simultaneously.  Furthermore, seemingly unrelated regression was developed for linear 
regression models and could produce inconsistent coefficient estimates when used for regressions with 
binary dependent variables. 
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unrelated regression model, but the dependent variables are binary indicator variables rather than 
continuous variables (Cappellari and Jenkins 2003).  Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit 
regression permits analyzing both tax strategies simultaneously, allows the inclusion of all 
observations rather than requiring that the sample be split based upon the dependent variable, 
and assumes a joint distribution of the two tax strategies.  Thus, this methodology specifically 
controls for the simultaneous nature of the decision to focus on one tax strategy and forego 
emphasizing the alternative tax strategy, providing consistent, and efficient, coefficient estimates 
for the effect of the variables of interest on the choice of tax strategy.   
 To examine whether managerial incentives and practices influence the choice of tax 
strategy, I develop a model of firms’ tax strategy choices.  Specifically, for each managerial 
incentive or practice, I estimate the following systems of equations:  
𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑆/𝑃𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑇𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2−7𝑇𝐴𝑋 𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8−10𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽11−12𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇/𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽13𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡
+  𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝜀                                                                                                            (1) 
𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑆/𝑃𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑇𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2−7𝑇𝐴𝑋 𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡     
+ 𝛽8−10𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽11−12𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇/𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽13𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡
+  𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝜀,                                                                                                           (2) 
where SUSTAIN is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm focuses primarily on a 
sustainable tax strategy, and zero otherwise, and MINIMIZE is an indicator variable equal to one 
if the firm focuses primarily on a minimization tax strategy, and zero otherwise (both defined 
above).  INCENTIVES/PRACTICES represents one of the four variables of interest: DELTA and 
VEGA, TAXEXPERT, and INFO TRANSFER, to be defined below.  All variables are defined in 
Appendix B. 
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I also include controls for firm characteristics, performance, and investing and reporting 
decisions that could potentially affect firms’ tax strategy choices.20  First, I control for firm 
characteristics that impact investments in tax planning, TAX PLANNING (Mills et al. 1998).  I 
proxy for firm size using the natural logarithm of sales (SIZE) and leverage using total long-term 
debt scaled by end-of-the-year total assets (LEVERAGE).  I also control for property, plant, and 
equipment, measured net of depreciation and scaled by end-of-the-year total assets (PPE); 
foreign operations, using an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has foreign income and 
zero otherwise (FOR_OP); tax loss carryforwards, using an indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm reports a tax loss carryforward and zero otherwise (TLCF); and complexity, using the 
number of segments a company reports in a given year (SEGMENTS).  These firm characteristics 
are important to tax strategy choice because they play a central role in determining firms’ 
available tax planning opportunities (Mills et al. 1998).     
I control for firm performance using three proxies – pre-tax earnings volatility, return-
on-assets, and the book-to-market ratio.  Firm performance will influence the choice of tax 
strategy for several reasons: a firm cannot owe taxes without earning a profit; resources for tax 
planning, income and cash flow, are derived from performance; and performance volatility 
potentially represents a non-tax cost.  I measure a firm’s pre-tax earnings volatility using the 
coefficient of variation of pre-tax book income (CV_PTBI), the standard deviation of annual pre-
tax book income scaled by the absolute value of the mean of pre-tax book income over the five-
year period, t-4 to t.  In addition, I control for the firm’s profitability using return-on-assets 
(ROA) and the book-to-market ratio (BTM).  I also include two measures of investing and 
                                                 
20 To develop a parsimonious model of firms’ tax strategy choices, I follow the procedure outlined by 
Hosmer and Lemeshow to determine a comprehensive, yet concise, set of control variables (Agresti 2007); 
however, I also examine the robustness of my results (discussed in Section 5) to the inclusion of additional 
control variables.   
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reporting decisions because these policies and tax strategy choice are likely governed by the 
same guiding principles and investment policy can have significant tax consequences.  I proxy 
for a firm’s investment in innovative products using research and development expense (RD) and 
control for a firm’s financial reporting decisions using the signed value of performance-adjusted 
discretionary accruals (DISC_ACC) following Kothari et al. (2005).  Further, when TAXEXPERT 
represents INCENTIVES/PRACTICES, I also include IMR, the inverse Mills ratio estimated from 
the selection model to be presented below, to control for the decision to purchase tax services 
from the audit firm.  Finally, I include industry (two-digit SIC code) fixed effects to control for 
different environments and opportunities across industries.    
4.3.1 Hypothesis One – Equity Incentives  
To investigate whether managerial incentives are associated with firms’ decisions to 
focus on a sustainable or minimization tax strategy, I simultaneously estimate models (1) and (2) 
using proxies for managers’ equity incentives.  My variables of interest are DELTA, the 
sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to changes in the stock price, and VEGA, the sensitivity of the 
CEO’s wealth to stock return volatility.21  Following Core and Guay (1999), I calculate DELTA 
as the change in the CEO’s wealth for a one percent change in the firm’s stock price.  I measure 
VEGA as the change in the value of the CEO’s stock option portfolio for a one percent change in 
stock return volatility (Guay 1999).  A positive (negative) and significant coefficient on DELTA 
or VEGA is consistent with firms being more (less) likely to concentrate on either the 
sustainability or minimization dimension of tax strategy when managers have higher values of 
DELTA or VEGA.  As suggested by Hypothesis 1, I expect the coefficient on DELTA to be 
                                                 
21 Following prior research (e.g., Chava and Purnanandam 2010; Coles et al. 2006; Rego and Wilson 
2012), I simultaneously estimate the effect of DELTA and VEGA on the choice of tax strategy to control 
for both the overlapping and competing nature of these incentives within the executive’s compensation 
contract.     
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positive for firms focusing on sustainability because these firms promote firm value through 
consistent tax avoidance and the coefficient on VEGA to be positive for firms focusing on 
minimization because these firms engage in relatively more risky tax activities to achieve the 
lowest possible tax outcome.       
4.3.2 Hypothesis Two – Expert Tax Advice 
To examine whether seeking expert tax advice influences the tax strategy choice, I 
simultaneously estimate models (1) and (2) using audit firm tax expertise to proxy for the advice 
that managers obtain from tax experts.22  My variable of interest is TAXEXPERT, an indicator 
variable equal to one if the firm hires its audit firm for tax services and that audit firm possesses 
industry-specific tax expertise.  Following McGuire et al. (2012), I define tax expertise as a tax 
service market share of 30 percent (25 percent) or more in years 2003 and later (2002 and 
earlier) within a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and industry, and zero otherwise.  A 
positive (negative) and significant coefficient on TAXEXPERT is consistent with firms with 
access to expert tax advice being more (less) likely to concentrate on either the sustainability or 
minimization dimension of tax strategy.  Hypothesis 2 suggests that the coefficient on 
TAXEXPERT will be positive for firms engaging in sustainable tax strategies because 
practitioners market tax planning with sustainable tax outcomes.  I also expect the coefficient on 
TAXEXPERT to be positive for firms focusing on minimization because expert tax advice likely 
contains innovative tax planning insights that reduce firms’ tax burdens. 
The decision to hire the audit firm for tax services is not random, but rather determined 
by both observable and unobservable factors (Lassila et al. 2010; McGuire et al. 2012).  
                                                 
22 A firm could also obtain professional advice from a tax expert that is not its auditor; however, publicly 
disclosed information on tax service provision is limited to firms that hire their auditor for tax services.  
Thus, due to current data availability, audit firm tax expertise is the best publicly available proxy for 
expert tax advice.   
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Therefore, my analysis of the effect of expert tax advice on firms’ tax strategy choices is 
potentially subject to selection bias because the factors that influence firms’ decisions to hire the 
audit firm for tax services may also affect the association between expert tax advice and tax 
strategy choice.  Consistent with prior research in accounting (e.g., Badertscher et al. 2009; 
McGuire et al. 2012; Omer et al. 2006; Tucker 2007), I employ the Heckman (1979) two-stage 
approach to control for potential selection bias.  This two-stage procedure requires the estimation 
of a selection model which is used to construct an inverse Mills ratio that is included as a control 
variable in the main analysis.   
Specifically, following McGuire et al. (2012), I estimate a probit regression that 
approximates the likelihood that a client hires its audit firm for tax services using the following 
model: 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽3𝑀𝐸𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡  
+  𝛽5𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽6𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽8𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽9𝑇𝐿𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10∆𝑇𝐿𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽11𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽12𝐹𝑂𝑅_𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽13𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡  
+  𝛽14𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽15𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽16𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽17𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽18𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡  
+  𝛽19𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽20𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽21𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀,         (3) 
 where all variables are defined in Appendix B.  I calculate the inverse Mills ratio, IMR, using 
the coefficient estimates from model (3) and include IMR as a control variable in my second-
stage regressions (i.e., models (1) and (2)/(4) and (5)).  The inverse Mills ratio corrects for 
selection bias by controlling for observable and unobservable factors that influence firms’ 
decisions to hire the auditor for tax services and that also potentially affect the association 
between expert tax advice and the choice of tax strategy (Heckman 1979).          
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4.3.3 Hypothesis Three – Information Transfer among Directors 
Finally, I examine whether information transferred through directors’ connections 
influences the decision to focus on a sustainable or minimization tax strategy by simultaneously 
estimating models (1) and (2) using INFO TRANSFER as the variable of interest.  I proxy for 
access to and transfer of information from other firms using directors’ connectivity, a measure of 
a director’s ability to obtain relevant information from other directors both within and outside of 
their firm’s industry.  INFO TRANSFER is a vector of four director centrality (connectivity) 
proxies measured using the factor score from a principal components factor analysis.  In social 
network analysis, measures of centrality are used to identify the importance of connections 
within the network and to study interactions and information transfer among individuals 
(Bonacich 1987; Freeman 1979; Newman 2010).   
The four centrality proxies that I use are NUM_CONNECTIONS, CONTROL, SPEED, 
and CONNECTION_STRENGTH.  NUM_CONNECTIONS is calculated as the number of unique 
connections a director has with other directors in the network and proxies for access to 
information; directors with more connections have better access to information.  CONTROL is 
calculated as the number of paths between two directors in the network, a and b, that pass 
through director i divided by the total number of paths between directors a and b and represents 
the control that director i has over the flow of information from one area of the network to 
another.  Directors with higher values of CONTROL are located on more paths between other 
directors in the network, and thus, control the flow of information.   
The third proxy, SPEED, is measured as the inverse of the sum of the shortest distances 
of the paths between the director and other directors in the network and captures the speed at 
which a director receives information within a network.  Directors with higher SPEED values 
receive information more quickly than directors with lower SPEED values.  Finally, 
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CONNECTION_STRENGTH is the number of unique connections a director has with other 
directors, where each of these connections is weighted based upon how well-connected those 
directors are within the network.  Thus, CONNECTION_STRENGTH measures the centrality of 
a director within a network by assuming that certain connections provide more access to 
information than others; therefore, connections to other highly-connected directors are more 
valuable and directors with these connections receive a higher score.23   
 Each measure is first calculated at the director level and then aggregated up to the board; 
thus, I examine the impact of information transfer to the board as a whole on the likelihood of 
emphasizing either a sustainable or minimization tax strategy.24  In the principal components 
factor analysis, all four variables load on a single factor with an eigenvalue of 2.78, and the 
proportion of the variance explained by the factor is approximately 70 percent.25  To examine 
Hypothesis 3, I am interested in the sign and significance of the coefficient on INFO 
TRANSFER.  A positive (negative) and significant coefficient on INFO TRANSFER suggests that 
firms are more (less) likely to focus on either the sustainability or minimization dimension of tax 
strategy when directors have greater access to tax planning information from other firms’ 
directors.  I expect the coefficient on INFO TRANSFER to be positive for firms focusing on 
sustainability if directors share tax planning information that facilitates achieving consistent tax 
outcomes.  Hypothesis 3 also posits that the coefficient on INFO TRANSFER will be positive for 
                                                 
23 Within the social network analysis literature, NUM_CONNECTIONS is known as degree, CONTROL is 
referred to as betweeness centrality, SPEED is an individual’s closeness centrality, and 
CONNECTION_STRENGTH is known as eigenvector centrality (Newman 2010).  I have used alternative 
names for ease of exposition and interpretability, but my calculations of these variables are consistent with 
this literature.      
 
24 I only include observations connected to the largest component of the network in my sample.  This 
component comprises approximately 83 percent of all directors with data necessary to calculate the 
centrality measures. 
 
25 The factor loadings of NUM_CONNECTIONS, CONTROL, SPEED, and CONNECTION_STRENGTH 
are 0.95, 0.86, 0.87, and 0.61, respectively.   
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firms focusing on minimization because directors are likely to share information about new tax 
avoidance opportunities.    
4.3.4 Relative Importance 
 These managerial incentives and practices are unlikely to be equally important in 
determining the primary focus of firms’ tax strategies.  To investigate the relative importance of 
these factors for tax strategy choice, I simultaneously include my proxies for equity incentives, 
expert tax advice, and information transferred through directorships in the analysis.  Specifically, 
I estimate the following system of equations:  
𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑉𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽5−10𝑇𝐴𝑋 𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11−13𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽14−15𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇/𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽16𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝜀                            (4) 
𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽5−10𝑇𝐴𝑋 𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽11−13𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽14−15𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇/𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽16𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝜀,                           (5) 
where all variables have been previously defined.  To determine which managerial incentives 
and practices are most important for firms’ tax strategy choices, I compare the standardized 
coefficients for the four variables of interest, 𝛽1 through 𝛽4, for each tax strategy model.  I do not 
make predictions regarding the relative importance of the managerial incentives and practices for 
the choice of tax strategy because it is unclear ex ante which of these factors will be the most 
important determinants of each tax strategy. 
 I use contemporaneous values of managerial incentives and practices to examine the 
determinants of firms’ tax strategy choices for several reasons.  First, prior research suggests that 
nonrecurring tax avoidance activities are a common method of tax reduction with firms seeking 
new opportunities each year (e.g., Mills et al. 1998), and because these activities change each 
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year, engaging in nonrecurring tax avoidance requires current information.  Furthermore, advice 
and information are only valuable when relevant.  While some information or advice may be 
applicable for years, timeliness tends to affect relevance, particularly in a rapidly changing 
environment.  Thus, given the continuous search for new tax planning ideas and the changing tax 
environment, the current year’s information and advice will be important for tax strategy choice.  
Finally, because managers’ equity incentives accumulate over time, and firms rebalance 
managers’ incentives annually to reflect current objectives, decision-making in the current 
period, including tax strategy choice, will be a function of this year’s incentives.26 
  
                                                 
26 My inferences remain unchanged if I use estimates of managerial incentives and practices from the prior 
year. 
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5. RESULTS 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 I present all tables referenced in the manuscript in Appendix C.  Table 1 reports 
descriptive statistics for my sample.  Table 1, Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the tax 
strategy measures, the proxies for managerial incentives and practices, and the controls for 
investments in tax planning, firm performance, and investing and reporting choices for the full 
sample.27  Panels B, C, and D of Table 1 present descriptive statistics for the two tax strategy 
subsamples, as well as descriptive statistics for firms in the sample that are not classified as 
engaging in either sustainable or minimization tax strategies (i.e., mixed tax strategies).28  
Univariate tests of mean and median differences of firm characteristics (untabulated) for firms 
with sustainable and minimization tax strategies indicate that these two subsamples are 
significantly different.  Relative to firms with minimization tax strategies, firms that employ 
sustainable tax strategies are larger and more segmented, but less levered and less likely to report 
a tax loss carryforward (all p <= 0.01).  Firms focusing on sustainability also have lower 
earnings volatility and book-to-market ratios and invest less in research and development, but 
earn a higher return-on-assets than firms emphasizing tax minimization (all p < 0.01).  However, 
                                                 
27 To ensure that my operationalizations of sustainability and minimization are capable of distinguishing 
between firms with different tax behavior, I examine the average range of annual cash ETRs (high – low) 
over the period t-2 to t for firms in each tax strategy subsample.  If I am identifying firms with different 
tax strategies, I would expect the average range of cash ETRs to be different for the two groups.  I find 
that, on average, firms that focus on minimization have a wider range of annual cash ETRs than firms that 
emphasize sustainability (0.169 versus 0.091).  These results indicate that firms identified as following a 
sustainable tax strategy have lower variation in their tax outcomes over time and that my proxies are 
measuring two distinct tax strategies.     
 
28 Although firms can (and do occasionally) change their tax strategies, a firm’s choice of tax strategy is 
relatively stationary over time.  Within my sample, 33 (39) percent of firms are classified as following a 
sustainable (minimization) tax strategy for 100 percent of their firm-year observations.  In addition, 64 
(75) percent of firms are classified as following a sustainable (minimization) tax strategy for 50 percent of 
their firm-year observations.   
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these firms exhibit similar investments in assets (PPE), an equal likelihood of operating in a 
foreign jurisdiction, and a similar level of discretionary accruals.  In addition, an untabulated 
analysis of the composition of the sample reveals that tax strategies are not concentrated within 
particular industries; I find that each tax strategy is present in all industries, where industry is 
defined by two-digit SIC codes.   
 Table 2 presents univariate correlations.29  Consistent with my definitions of tax 
strategy, I find that CV_CETR (CETR3) is negatively associated with SUSTAIN (MINIMIZE).  In 
addition, all four proxies of managerial incentives and practices are positively associated with 
SUSTAIN, while VEGA is positively associated with MINIMIZE.  With the exception of the 
correlation between TAXEXPERT and VEGA, the variables of interest are positively associated 
with one another, indicating that they may be used jointly to promote a desired tax strategy.30  
Furthermore, the incentives and practices and tax strategy variables are correlated with many of 
the control variables, indicating that a multivariate analysis is appropriate to control for the effect 
of these characteristics on the choice of tax strategy.           
5.2 Hypothesis One – Equity Incentives 
 Table 3 presents the results of simultaneously estimating models (1) and (2) to examine 
the effect of managerial incentives on the likelihood that the firm emphasizes a sustainable or 
minimization tax strategy.  Simultaneous estimation of the two models is appropriate because the 
likelihood ratio test of independence between the two models indicates that these two tax 
                                                 
29 All coefficients discussed here (and in bold in Table 2) are significant at a minimum of the five percent 
level. 
 
30 I further examine the association between DELTA and VEGA by investigating the correlation of their 
quintile rankings.  My untabulated results indicate that, in general, firms with higher values of VEGA also 
have higher values of DELTA, which is consistent with the need to incentivize focusing on value in 
addition to risk.  Furthermore, there are zero instances of firms with VEGA in the top quintile and DELTA 
in the lowest quintile, suggesting that, if a firm incentivizes risk-taking, it must do so in a manner that also 
encourages value maximization.   
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strategy choices are not independent (p < 0.01).31  I find a positive and significant coefficient on 
DELTA (p < 0.01) in column (1), indicating that firms with CEOs whose wealth is more 
sensitive to changes in the stock price are more likely to focus on sustainability.  The average 
marginal effect in column (3) indicates that a $1,000,000 increase in the CEO’s wealth increases 
the probability that the firm chooses a sustainable tax strategy by 0.009.32  In column (2), the 
positive and significant coefficient on VEGA (p < 0.01) suggests that managerial incentives that 
increase the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to stock return volatility are associated with a higher 
likelihood that the firm emphasizes minimization.33  The average marginal effects reported in 
columns (3) and (4) indicate that a $1,000,000 increase in the value of the CEO’s stock option 
portfolio increases (decreases) the probability that a firm focuses on minimization 
(sustainability) by 0.097 (0.053).34    
 Collectively, my results in Table 3 support Hypothesis 1 and suggest that managers 
make decisions in a manner consistent with the incentives they are provided through their 
compensation contracts.  In other words, their tax strategy choices reflect their equity incentives 
predictably.  For example, firms are more likely to focus on sustainability when managers are 
                                                 
31 This methodology also produces an estimate of the correlation among the error terms of the two models, 
which indicates that these models are significantly, negatively correlated (p < 0.01), consistent with the 
decision to focus on one dimension of tax strategy reducing the likelihood that the firm focuses on the 
other dimension of tax strategy. 
 
32 The average total compensation for S&P 500 CEOs was $12.3 million in 2012, an increase of 8 percent 
over the previous year (AFL-CIO 2013; Popelka 2013), which corresponds to an increase of 
approximately $1,000,000.   
 
33 My inferences are unchanged when I also control for the volatility of return-on-assets and prior tax 
avoidance (i.e., three-year cash ETR calculated over the period t-2 to t-4). 
 
34 I also examine whether equity incentives interact with either expert tax advice or information from 
directors’ connections to influence the choice of tax strategy by including DELTA and VEGA and their 
interaction terms with TAXEXPERT and INFO TRANSFER, respectively, in the analysis of Hypotheses 2 
and 3.  I do not find a consistent interaction effect, and my inferences with respect to the main effects of 
all variables of interest remain the same.     
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incentivized to focus on firm performance and the stock price, which reflects the fact that 
consistently achieving a tax outcome improves the firm’s ability to meet earnings’ targets, 
resulting in a stable and positively growing stock price.  Similarly, firms are more likely to 
emphasize minimization when managers are incentivized to undertake projects that are riskier, 
but have positive expectations, consistent with managers engaging in tax planning activities that 
have a wider range of possible outcomes (i.e., new or previously scrutinized activities or 
activities that are subject to ambiguous interpretation of the tax law) which increase the volatility 
of net income and returns.    
5.3 Hypothesis Two – Expert Tax Advice  
 Table 4 presents the results of estimating the decision to hire the audit firm for tax 
services (model 3).  The selection model exhibits more than adequate discriminatory power with 
an area under the ROC curve of 0.83 (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2002).  The results are generally 
consistent with those of McGuire et al. (2012) and Lassila et al. (2010).  Notably, audit firm 
tenure and audit fees are associated with a higher probability that the client will hire the audit 
firm for tax services, while the magnitude of non-tax, non-audit fees is negatively associated 
with the probability that the client will hire the audit firm for tax services.  The inverse Mills 
ratio, IMR, is calculated from the coefficient estimates reported in Table 4 and included as an 
additional control variable in models (1) and (2).        
Table 5 presents the results from simultaneously estimating models (1) and (2) 
examining the effect of audit firm tax expertise on the likelihood that firms concentrate on a 
sustainable or minimization tax strategy.  The likelihood ratio test of independence between the 
two models is significant (p < 0.01); thus, simultaneous estimation of the choice of tax strategy 
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is appropriate.35  I find a positive and significant coefficient on TAXEXPERT (p < 0.05) in 
column (2), indicating that firms with access to expert tax advice have a higher likelihood of 
focusing on minimization, consistent with Hypothesis 2.  In column (4), the average marginal 
effect for TAXEXPERT suggests that hiring a tax expert audit firm for tax services increases the 
probability of choosing a minimization tax strategy by 0.033.36  The negative, but insignificant 
coefficient on TAXEXPERT in column (1) implies that expert tax advice is not a significant 
determinant of the decision to emphasize a sustainable tax strategy.37, 38   
 My results in Table 5 are consistent with expert tax advice improving a firm’s access to 
tax planning opportunities, industry-specific information, and innovative tax avoidance activities 
that can reduce its tax burden.  Specifically, I find that hiring a tax expert audit firm for tax 
services increases the likelihood that a firm focuses on minimization, suggesting that the 
expertise of tax practitioners (i.e., knowledge of the tax law, the client’s industry, and revenue 
authorities’ procedures) improves a firm’s ability to achieve the lowest possible tax outcome.  In 
contrast, I find that consulting a tax expert is not associated with implementing a sustainable tax 
                                                 
35 Furthermore, the estimate of the correlation among the error terms indicates that these two models are 
significantly, negatively correlated (p < 0.01), as expected.     
 
36 The marginal effects presented in columns (3) and (4) are estimated for the regression model that 
excludes IMR.  The marginal effects estimation procedures available for bivariate probit regression do not 
permit the computation of marginal effects for factor (or predicted) variables.   
 
37 My results are robust to including all of the additional controls from McGuire et al. (2012) - the change 
in value of the tax loss carryforward; the amount of equity income, cash, and depreciation and 
amortization expense; the market value of the company relative to the value of all possible clients in the 
same MSA and industry; Big 4 or second-tier (Grant Thornton or BDO Seidman) audit firms; and prior tax 
avoidance (i.e., three-year cash ETR calculated over the period t-2 to t-4).    
 
38 In an untabulated analysis, I examine whether my results are sensitive to the level of tax fees paid to the 
auditor.  I separately include indicator variables equal to one if tax fees scaled by audit fees is greater than 
the mean, median, or third quartile and interact that indicator variable with TAXEXPERT.  In all instances, 
I find that neither the tax fee indicator variable, nor the interaction between the tax fee indicator variable 
and TAXEXPERT are significant.  These results indicate that my results are not driven solely by firms 
paying high tax fees to their auditor, which may be indicative of tax planning (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2013).     
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strategy.  This result suggests that tax experts offer more information about new or industry-
specific tax planning techniques, which are not as useful for emphasizing sustainability, than 
more predictable tax planning opportunities.   
5.4 Hypothesis Three – Information Transfer among Directors  
 Table 6 presents the results of simultaneously estimating models (1) and (2) to examine 
the effect of information transferred through directors’ connections on the likelihood that firms 
concentrate on a sustainable or minimization tax strategy.  The likelihood ratio test of 
independence indicates that the two choices of tax strategy are not independent (p < 0.01), 
suggesting that simultaneous estimation is appropriate.39  Consistent with Hypothesis 3, my 
results suggest that information transferred through directors’ connections is important for the 
choice of tax strategy.  In column (1), I find a negative and significant coefficient on INFO 
TRANSFER (p < 0.05), indicating that firms whose directors have more connections to other 
directors, greater access to information, and more control over the flow of information have a 
lower likelihood of focusing on sustainability.  The positive and significant coefficient on INFO 
TRANSFER (p < 0.01) in column (2) suggests that information transferred through directors’ 
connections is associated with a higher likelihood of emphasizing minimization.40  The average 
marginal effects reported in columns (3) and (4) indicate that a one unit increase in INFO 
TRANSFER (i.e., an increase in director connectedness) increases (decreases) the probability of 
emphasizing minimization (sustainability) by 0.021 (0.019).      
                                                 
39 Consistent with the prior regressions, the estimate of the correlation among the error terms indicates that 
the two models are significantly, negatively correlated (p < 0.01). 
 
40 My results are robust to the inclusion of controls for board characteristics – size, busy directors, and 
independent directors, as well as prior tax avoidance (i.e., three-year cash ETR calculated over the period 
t-2 to t-4). 
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 My results in Table 6 are consistent with prior research that finds that corporate policies 
are transferred from one organization to another via connected directors.  Specifically, tax 
planning information from outside sources (i.e., other firms’ directors) is useful for enabling 
firms to reduce their tax burdens.  I find that firms with greater access to information through 
more highly connected directors are less likely to focus on identifying opportunities to maintain 
a consistent tax outcome (i.e., to choose a sustainable tax strategy) and are more likely to take 
advantage of the information to reduce taxes and emphasize minimization.  Thus, the tax 
planning information transferred through directors appears to contain relatively more 
information about new tax planning opportunities, which are useful for minimizing taxes, but not 
necessarily for obtaining consistent tax outcomes.   
5.5 Relative Importance  
Finally, Table 7 presents the results from simultaneously estimating models (4) and (5) 
to examine the relative importance of the managerial incentives and practices for firms’ tax 
strategy choices.41,42  The likelihood ratio test of independence between the two models indicates 
that the models are not independent (p < 0.01); thus, simultaneous estimation is appropriate.43  
To determine which factor has the most influence on the choice of tax strategy, I report fully 
standardized coefficients in Table 7 to permit comparing the relative size of the coefficients.  My 
                                                 
41 Including all variables in the model does not pose a multi-collinearity problem.  The highest condition 
index is 28.5, with the relation between SIZE and the intercept contributing significantly to this condition 
index; however, it is still below the rule of thumb of 30 (Belsley et al. 1980).  The second highest 
condition index is 11.07, due to the relation between ROA and BTM; thus, I conclude that multi-
collinearity is not problematic for my analysis.    
  
42 Models (4) and (5) predict firms’ choice of tax strategy very well.  I perform classification tests by 
obtaining the predicted probability that the firm engages in a sustainable or minimization tax strategy from 
the regression analysis presented in Table 7.  Using a cutoff probability of 0.6, I find that the model 
correctly classifies firms following a sustainable (minimization) tax strategy 83 (75) percent of the time.  
   
43 The estimate of the correlation among the error terms of the two regressions indicates that the error 
terms of the two models are significantly, negatively correlated (p < 0.01), consistent with the decision to 
focus on one tax strategy reducing the likelihood that the firm also focuses on the other tax strategy.     
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results are consistent with the separate tests of each factor reported above (i.e., all coefficients 
retain the same sign and level of significance).44  In column (1), the coefficient on DELTA 
(INFO TRANSFER) is positive (negative) and significant (p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, respectively).  
The coefficients on VEGA, TAXEXPERT, and INFO TRANSFER are all positive and significant 
in column (2) (p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, respectively).     
The results in Table 7 suggest that the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to stock price 
(DELTA) is relatively more important than information from directors’ connections (INFO 
TRANSFER) to the decision to emphasize sustainability (Z = 2.16, p < 0.05).45  Furthermore, 
firms that focus on minimization are influenced most by equity incentives (VEGA), followed by 
expert tax advice, and finally, information from directors’ connections.  Tests of the difference in 
the coefficients demonstrate that the coefficient on VEGA is significantly larger than the 
coefficients on both TAXEXPERT and INFO TRANSFER (Z = 2.48 and -1.72, p < 0.01 and p < 
0.05, respectively), indicating that equity incentives influence the choice of a minimization tax 
strategy to a greater extent than expert tax advice or information from directors’ connections.  
Furthermore, the coefficient on TAXEXPERT is also significantly larger than the coefficient on 
INFO TRANSFER (Z = 1.29, p < 0. 10), suggesting that expert tax advice influences an emphasis 
on minimization more than information from directors’ connections.   
The prior literature has separately documented associations between the level of tax 
avoidance (i.e., cash or GAAP ETRs) and equity incentives, audit firm tax expertise, and board 
interlocks (however, not director connectedness), but has not considered whether these factors 
                                                 
44 The only coefficient that has a lower level of significance is the coefficient on INFO TRANSFER in 
column (2).  This coefficient was significant at the one percent level in Table 6 and is now only marginally 
significant; however, my overall conclusions remain unchanged.   
 
45 I test the equality of the regression coefficients following equation (4) of Paternoster et al. (1998, 862).  
Specifically, the Z-statistic is equal to the difference in the regression coefficients divided by the square 
root of the sum of the squared standard errors for the two regression coefficients.  
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are important for explaining a firm’s tax strategy choice or are incremental to one another in 
determining this choice.  The results of my relative importance analysis establish that, for tax 
strategy, each of these factors is incremental to others.  Furthermore, among the variables of 
interest, my results suggest that, in general, equity incentives are the most important 
determinants of tax strategy choice, followed by the practices of obtaining external information 
from tax experts or from directors at other firms.  My results demonstrate that equity incentives 
are not only associated with tax outcomes, as provided in the prior literature, but are the primary 
determinants of tax strategy choice, which produces the observed tax outcomes.  Furthermore, 
managerial incentives outweigh the effects of management practices on those same tax 
outcomes.  
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6. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
6.1 Matched Firm Analysis 
   The income and expenses arising from different activities (e.g., acquiring a new asset 
versus operating in a foreign country) are not always treated similarly for tax purposes; thus, the 
tax benefits of various activities may not be equal (Inger 2014), leading firms to have different 
tax planning opportunity sets (Mills et al. 1998).  A firm’s tax planning opportunities can affect 
its chosen tax strategy.  Therefore, firms with sustainable tax strategies may have different tax 
planning opportunities relative to firms with minimization tax strategies, which could generate 
differences in managerial incentives and practices across the two sets of firms and potentially 
explain my findings.  Because tax planning opportunities are related to firm characteristics, I also 
conduct my analysis using a matched sample, which holds tax planning opportunities constant 
while examining the influence of managerial incentives and practices on tax strategy choice.   
 To create a sample for this analysis, I match firms following sustainable tax strategies 
(SUSTAIN = 1) to firms following minimization tax strategies (MINIMIZE = 1) without 
replacement on SIZE within both industry (Fama-French 17 classification) and year.  This 
procedure yields a sample of 1,998 firm-year observations (999 unique matched pairs).  Utilizing 
this matched sample, I re-examine my hypotheses using a logistic regression where the 
dependent variable is SUSTAIN and the independent variables are as previously defined.  The 
results of this analysis are presented in Table 8.     
 In all four columns of Table 8, the coefficient on SIZE is no longer significant, 
indicating that the matching procedure resulted in a good match; however, to control for any 
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residual bias due to imperfect matching, I include SIZE in each regression.46  Similar to the 
results of my main analyses, I find a positive and significant coefficient on DELTA (p < 0.01), 
suggesting that firms with CEOs whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in the stock price are 
more likely to implement a sustainable tax strategy relative to a minimization tax strategy.  I also 
find negative and significant coefficients on TAXEXPERT and INFO TRANSFER (both p < 
0.05).  These results indicate that firms with access to expert tax advice or with more well-
connected directors are less likely to emphasize sustainability and more likely to concentrate on 
minimization, consistent with the results of my analysis in Tables 3 through 7.  Thus, my results 
suggest that tax planning opportunities are not the only determinant of tax strategy choice.  
Furthermore, differences in opportunity sets do not subsume the association between managerial 
incentives and practices and tax strategy choice, holding these opportunities constant, managerial 
incentives and practices continue to be significant determinants of firms’ tax strategy choices.     
6.2 Firm Value Analysis 
 Consistent with Scholes et al. (2009), I defined tax strategy as a pattern of decision-
making and actions with respect to tax planning that maximizes after-tax returns and firm value 
and investigated two dimensions of tax strategy presented in recent empirical and anecdotal 
evidence, sustainability and minimization (e.g., Deloitte LLP 2013; KPMG LLP 2007; McGuire 
et al. 2013).  Because the strategy literature suggests that there are multiple methods for 
achieving the goal of any strategy and that firms will choose a strategy that suits its situation 
(Hambrick 1983; Miller 1987; Porter 2004; Zahra and Covin 1993), I implicitly assume that both 
sustainability and minimization create value for firms.  In this analysis, I test this assumption by 
                                                 
46 In addition to matching on SIZE, I also matched firms within industry and year on SIZE and LEVERAGE 
and SIZE, LEVERAGE, and TLCF, respectively.  Conducting the analysis with these two matched samples 
yields inferences that are consistent with those reported in Table 8 (i.e., the sign and significance of all 
variables of interest remains the same).      
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examining whether firms that choose either a sustainable or minimization tax strategy exhibit a 
higher market value of equity relative to firms with a mixed tax strategy (i.e., a tax strategy with 
attributes of both sustainability and minimization).       
 Specifically, I conduct a univariate analysis, presented in Table 9, in which I test the 
differences in the mean and median values of market value of equity (MVE) for firms following 
a sustainable or minimization tax strategy relative to other firms that have not clearly established 
one of these tax strategies.  MVE is calculated as the product of the number of common shares 
outstanding and the stock price measured on the last day of the fiscal year, scaled by end-of-year 
total assets.  I measure MVE in the current year, as well as in the three subsequent years.  Panel 
A (B) of Table 9 presents the results of tests of mean and median differences in MVE for firms 
following a sustainable (minimization) tax strategy relative to firms that choose a mixed tax 
strategy.  I find that firms following a sustainable tax strategy have significantly higher MVE 
than firms following a mixed tax strategy in both the current and subsequent years (all p < 0.01), 
suggesting that a sustainable tax strategy is associated with higher firm value.  Similarly, in 
Panel B, I find that firms following a minimization tax strategy also have significantly higher 
current and future MVE relative to firms classified as following a mixed tax strategy (all p < 
0.01), suggesting that minimization is also associated with greater firm value.   
 Taken together, the results presented in Table 9 indicate that firms that explicitly choose 
a tax strategy have higher market values than firms with tax strategies that are not well defined, 
supporting the argument presented in the strategy literature that any dimension of a strategy can 
be value-maximizing.  My results do not quantify the direct impact that tax strategy choice has 
on firm value.  However, these results do suggest that firms that choose a specific tax strategy 
are more valuable in general, implying that managers are making value-creating decisions and 
suggesting that the choice of tax strategy is important for maximizing firm value.   
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6.3 Forward Tax Strategy Analysis 
 I investigate the association between tax strategy choice and contemporaneous values of 
managerial incentives and practices to capture the timeliness and relevance of new information 
received during the current year, as well as the accumulation and rebalancing of equity 
incentives on an annual basis.  However, strategy decisions are sticky (e.g., Bentley et al. 2012).  
As discussed previously, although firms can and do change their tax strategies, a firm’s tax 
strategy choice is relatively stationary over time.47  Thus, I also investigate firms’ future tax 
strategy choices to examine the extent to which current managerial incentives and practices 
influence future decisions.   
 To investigate firms’ future tax strategy choices, I regress my proxies for firms’ tax 
strategies measured at a future date on current period values of managerial incentives and 
practices and controls.  Specifically, I re-estimate models (4) and (5) using SUSTAIN and 
MINIMIZE measured at three alternative points in time, one-, two-, and four-years ahead.48  The 
estimated coefficients on the variables of interest represent the association between current 
period managerial incentives and practices and future tax strategy choice.  A significant 
coefficient indicates that not only are current period incentives and practices determinants of this 
year’s choice of tax strategy, but that their influence also carries over into future choices.          
 Table 10 presents the results of my analysis.  In columns (1) and (2), the choice of tax 
strategy is measured in year t+1.  I find negative and significant coefficients on VEGA and INFO 
TRANSFER in column (1) (p < 0.01 and p < 0.10, respectively), which suggests that firms whose 
                                                 
47 Approximately 64 (75) percent of firms in my sample are classified as following a sustainable 
(minimization) tax strategy for 50 percent of their firm-year observations.   
 
48 I measure tax strategy as far as four years into the future because five years of data is required to 
measure CV_CETR.  Thus, in year t+4, CV_CETR is comprised of cash ETRs from years t+4 to t, which 
ensures that the tax strategy is measured using only current and future tax outcomes.     
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CEOs are compensated for stock return volatility or firms with more well-connected directors 
are less likely to choose a sustainable tax strategy.  In column (2), I find positive and significant 
coefficients on VEGA and TAXEXPERT (p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, respectively), indicating that 
firms whose CEO’s wealth is more sensitive to changes in stock return volatility and firms with 
access to expert tax advice are more likely to implement a minimization tax strategy.  
Collectively, these results (and my inferences) are consistent with those reported in my main 
analysis and suggest that current period managerial incentives and practices influence the choice 
of tax strategy in the next period.   
 Columns (3) and (4) present the results using tax strategy measured in year t+2, and 
columns (5) and (6) present the results when tax strategy choice is measured in year t+4.  In both 
analyses, I find positive and significant coefficients on DELTA and negative and significant 
coefficients on TAXEXPERT for SUSTAIN (all p < 0.10), which indicates that firms whose 
CEO’s wealth is more sensitive to changes in the stock price are more likely to choose a 
sustainable tax strategy, but firms with access to expert tax advice are less likely to emphasize 
sustainability.  In columns (4) and (6), I find positive and significant coefficients on VEGA for 
MINIMIZE (both p < 0.01), implying that firms whose CEOs are rewarded for stock return 
volatility are more likely to implement a minimization tax strategy.  In combination, the results 
of Table 10 confirm that current period managerial incentives and practices have predictability 
for future tax strategy choice; however, they also showcase the importance of considering the 
contemporaneous association to more completely incorporate the influence that these factors 
have on the choice of tax strategy.   
 In conjunction with my main analysis, I find that current period managerial incentives 
and practices are associated with both current and future tax strategy choices, implying that these 
factors likely influence both one-time tax planning activities and changes to tax planning, as well 
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as recurring tax avoidance activities.  Furthermore, as expected, I find that the associations 
attenuate as tax strategy is measured further out in time, but in a manner consistent with the 
results of my relative importance analysis.  Specifically, I find that managerial incentives 
continue to be highly significant predictors of the choice of tax strategy four-years ahead, but 
director connectedness is no longer significantly associated with tax strategy choice and the 
significance of expert tax advice is lessened.  This attenuation parallels my findings in Table 7 
that, within these factors, managerial incentives are the most important determinants of tax 
strategy choice followed by obtaining expert tax advice and information from directors’ 
connections.      
6.4 Tax Strategy Classification using GAAP ETR   
 I define tax strategies using cash ETRs because firms’ tax strategies should ultimately 
manifest in cash outflow to taxing authorities.  Firms have less discretion in the calculation of 
taxable income than in the calculation of financial statement income (Hanlon et al. 2005), and 
prior literature finds numerous instances in which firms manage earnings to meet benchmarks or 
to present a more favorable picture of their performance (see Dechow et al. (2010) for a review 
of the literature).  Thus, to more clearly identify firms’ tax strategies, I classified firms using 
measures based upon cash ETRs.  However, the prior literature provides evidence that many 
firms are concerned about the ETR reported on the financial statements, or GAAP ETR.  For 
example, managers are incentivized to reduce GAAP ETRs (Phillips 2003; Robinson et al. 2010; 
Armstrong et al. 2012), and firms with CEOs whose bonuses are determined by after-tax 
performance measures report lower GAAP ETRs (Powers et al. 2013).  Because GAAP ETRs 
may be the tax benchmark of interest for some firms, I extend my main analysis by investigating 
whether managerial incentives and practices are associated with the choice of tax strategy, where 
tax strategy is defined using GAAP ETRs.        
  56 
 For this analysis, I define sustainable and minimization tax strategies in terms of GAAP 
ETRs.  Specifically, I classify a firm as following a sustainable tax strategy for financial 
statement purposes if its coefficient of variation of annual GAAP ETRs (CV_GETR) measured 
over the five-year period, t to t-4, is in the lowest quintile for the year and as following a 
minimization tax strategy for financial statement purposes if its three-year GAAP ETR (GETR3) 
measured over the period t to t-2 is less than or equal to 20 percent.  Tax expense and cash taxes 
paid are products of significantly different calculations subject to different levels of judgment.  
Consistent with these two measures representing different aspects of firms’ tax burdens, an 
examination of the overlap of tax strategy defined using cash ETRs and GAAP ETRs reveals 
that the two classification schemes result in identifying different samples of firms focusing on 
sustainability and minimization (i.e., approximately 51 (35) percent of firms classified as 
following a sustainable (minimization) tax strategy using cash ETRs are also classified as 
following that tax strategy using GAAP ETRs).  Because of these differences, I define firms as 
following sustainable or minimization tax strategies if both cash and GAAP ETRs indicate the 
same tax strategy choice and re-estimate models (4) and (5) to examine the influence of 
managerial incentives and practices on firms’ choice of tax strategy.           
 Table 11 reports the results of this additional analysis – the regression results for 
SUSTAIN are presented in column (1), while the results for MINIMIZE are presented in column 
(2).  My results with respect to expert tax advice and director connectedness are similar to those 
reported in my primary analysis.  Specifically, in column (2), I find positive and significant 
coefficients on TAXEXPERT (p < 0.05) and INFO TRANSFER (p < 0.10), indicating that firms 
with access to expert tax advice or with more well-connected directors are more likely to 
implement a minimization tax strategy.  I find a negative and significant coefficient on INFO 
TRANSFER in column (1) (p < 0.01), which suggests that firms with more well-connected 
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directors are less likely to emphasize sustainability.  Thus, my inferences regarding the effect of 
these managerial practices on firms’ tax strategy choices are unchanged when tax strategy is 
measured using GAAP ETRs.  However, although the positive coefficient on DELTA (VEGA) in 
column (1) (column (2)) implies that firms whose CEOs’ wealth is more sensitive to changes in 
the stock price (stock return volatility) are more likely to implement a sustainable (minimization) 
tax strategy, neither coefficient is statistically significant at conventional levels.  Therefore, my 
results regarding managerial incentives are attenuated when I measure tax strategy using GAAP 
ETRs, but my analysis indicates that managerial practices are significant determinants of firms’ 
tax strategy choices regardless of the measurement of tax strategies. 
6.5 Mixed Tax Strategy Analysis 
 The strategy literature suggests that it is almost impossible for a firm to fully emphasize 
two dimensions of a strategy at once (March 1991).  Therefore, consistent with prior studies 
(e.g., Bentley et al. 2012; Higgins et al. 2014), I have focused on identifying and examining 
those firms that choose a salient tax strategy.  However, although difficult to implement 
effectively, firms can have mixed strategies which incorporate elements of multiple dimensions 
of a strategy (Miles et al. 1978; Porter 2004).  A sizeable portion of my sample is not classified 
as following either a sustainable or a minimization tax strategy, which suggests that there are a 
number of firms that pursue a mixed tax strategy.  Therefore, to provide initial evidence on these 
firms, I also investigate whether managerial incentives and practices influence the choice of a 
mixed tax strategy (i.e., a tax strategy with elements of both sustainability and minimization).   
I conduct both univariate and multivariate analyses of the firms that choose to 
implement a mixed tax strategy.  I define a firm as following a mixed tax strategy (i.e., MIXED 
equal to one) if both SUSTAIN and MINIMIZE are equal to zero.  Table 12 presents descriptive 
statistics for each tax strategy group and univariate tests of mean and median differences 
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between the groups.  Panel A compares firms emphasizing sustainability to firms following a 
mixed tax strategy.  I find that mixed tax strategy firms are smaller, more likely to report a 
TLCF, have more volatile pre-tax book income, and engage in more R&D than firms following a 
sustainable tax strategy (all p < 0.01).  In Panel B, I find that firms identified as implementing a 
mixed tax strategy are more capital intensive and segmented, less likely to have foreign 
operations or report a TLCF, have less volatile pre-tax book income, and engage in less R&D 
than firms concentrating on minimization (all p < 0.05).  Thus, firms following a mixed tax 
strategy share some characteristics and differ on others relative to firms choosing a more salient 
tax strategy, which is consistent with these firms incorporating elements of both sustainable and 
minimization tax strategies.       
To examine the association between managerial incentives and practices and the choice 
of a mixed tax strategy, I employ a multinomial logistic regression to compare the effect of a 
managerial incentive or practice on the likelihood that a firm chooses a mixed tax strategy 
relative to either a sustainable or minimization tax strategy.49  In general, my analysis, presented 
in Table 13, indicates that the coefficient on the variable of interest for the mixed tax strategy 
firms is significant in the opposite direction of the coefficient previously reported for the base 
group (either SUSTAIN or MINIMIZE).  Specifically, in columns (1) and (2), when the base 
group for comparison is SUSTAIN, I find a negative and significant coefficient on DELTA (p < 
0.05), which suggests that firms whose CEOs’ wealth is more sensitive to changes in the stock 
price are less likely to implement a mixed tax strategy relative to a sustainable tax strategy.  
Similarly, in columns (3) and (4) when MINIMIZE is the base group for comparison, I find 
                                                 
49 To investigate whether these managerial incentives and practices are equally relevant for all tax 
strategies, I conduct a factor analysis of my four proxies for each tax strategy subsample.  I find similar 
factor loadings for each variable within the three subsamples, which suggests that the manner in which 
these factors influence the choice of tax strategy is similar for all tax strategies.  Thus, these factors are 
relevant to the choice of any tax strategy.     
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negative and significant coefficients on VEGA, TAXEXPERT, and INFO TRANSFER (all p < 
0.05).  These results indicate that firms with CEOs who are compensated for stock return 
volatility or firms that have access to expert tax advice or highly connected directors are less 
likely to choose a mixed tax strategy relative to focusing on minimization.  Collectively, my 
results indicate that the effect of managerial incentives and practices on the choice of a mixed tax 
strategy falls near the middle of the effect of these factors on the choice of a sustainable or 
minimization tax strategy, consistent with these firms incorporating elements of both dimensions 
of tax strategy.    
6.6 Both Tax Strategy Analysis 
 Although the strategy literature suggests that it is difficult, if not almost impossible, for a 
firm to emphasize two dimensions of a strategy at once (March 1991), there are firms that are 
successful at achieving a multi-dimensional approach to a strategy’s objective.  Consistent with 
there being some, but relatively few, firms capable of achieving this feat, I identify 187 
observations in my sample that are classified as following both a sustainable and a minimization 
tax strategy.  These firm-year observations comprise only four percent of my sample.  However, 
this sample represents a unique set of firms that are successful at achieving a difficult goal, and 
thus, presents an interesting opportunity to learn more about firms that are able to simultaneously 
emphasize two dimensions of a strategy.        
 Given the small sample of observations that emphasize both sustainability and 
minimization, I focus on univariate tests, presented in Table 14, to examine the similarities and 
differences of this sample relative to firms that focus exclusively on sustainability (Panel A) or 
minimization (Panel B).  Based on differences in the mean and median values of CV_CETR and 
CETR3, firms that pursue both dimensions of tax strategy have more volatile annual cash ETRs 
than firms that solely emphasize sustainability and higher three-year cash ETRs than firms that 
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primarily focus on minimization (all p < 0.01).  These univariate tests suggest that firms that 
emphasize sustainability and minimization simultaneously are more moderate than those firms 
that only pursue one dimension of tax strategy in terms of both the level and variability of tax 
avoidance.  Given the difficulty of emphasizing multiple dimensions of a strategy, as portrayed 
by the prior literature, this more moderate approach to both dimensions seems necessary.   
With respect to firm characteristics, these firms are larger and more segmented with 
higher signed values of discretionary accruals than firms focusing on either sustainability or 
minimization (all p < 0.01).  However, relative to firms with sustainable tax strategies, firms that 
emphasize both tax strategy dimensions engage in more R&D (p < 0.01), but are not different 
with respect to firm performance.  Relative to firms with minimization tax strategies, firms that 
focus on both dimensions of tax strategy have higher performance (all p < 0.01), but do not 
differ on the level of investment in R&D.  Thus, these firms appear to have more flexibility and 
more available tax planning opportunities, which permits minimizing their tax burdens 
consistently over time.  It is also important to note that, on average, relative to either firms with 
sustainable or minimization tax strategies, firms that emphasize both dimensions of tax strategy 
have higher values of managerial incentives and practices (all p < 0.10).  This result suggests 
that, not only do these firms appear to have the resources and capabilities to focus on both 
sustainability and minimization, but they also have the necessary incentives and practices in 
place to encourage managers to focus on both dimensions of tax strategy, a rare combination that 
allows them to achieve a difficult task.                 
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7. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
7.1 Alternative Specification of Minimization 
 I examine the sensitivity of my measure of a minimization tax strategy to different 
measurement periods because prior research has also used five and ten years to measure tax 
avoidance (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2008).  Specifically, I categorize a firm as following a 
minimization tax strategy if its five-year cash ETR is less than or equal to 20 percent.  Using this 
alternative proxy, all variables of interest maintain the same sign and level of significance with 
the exception of INFO TRANSFER in model (2), which remains positive, but is no longer 
significant at conventional levels.  However, my overall inferences are the same; thus, I conclude 
that my results are robust to measuring minimization over a longer period.  
7.2 Removal of Non-Tax Planning Firms 
 It may be less costly for firms with extremely high non-tax costs to forego tax avoidance 
and pay tax at the top corporate statutory tax rate.  Because these firms will consistently pay high 
taxes, they could potentially be classified as emphasizing sustainability.  To ensure that my 
results, particularly those for sustainable tax strategies, are not due to firms that are not engaging 
in tax planning, I restrict my sample to observations that have a CETR3 less than 35 percent and 
re-estimate my regression models.  Using this restricted sample, my conclusions are unchanged.  
All variables of interest maintain the same sign and level of significance with the exception of 
INFO TRANSFER in model (5), which remains positive, but is no longer statistically significant.  
However, considered in conjunction with the negative and significant coefficient on INFO 
TRANSFER in model (4) when SUSTAIN is the dependent variable, my inferences are the same.  
Thus, my results are robust to excluding firms that do not engage in tax planning.            
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7.3 Controlling for Business Strategy and Life Cycle 
 The management literature indicates that the individual strategies within firms are 
aligned to achieve the firm’s overall objectives (Miller 1986; Porter 2004; Zahra and Covin 
1993); thus, firms’ tax strategies may be linked to their business strategies.  Similarly, firms 
undergo changes as they progress through their life cycles from introduction to maturity, and 
ultimately, decline (Gort and Klepper 1982), which will influence their operations and may also 
alter their approaches to tax planning and tax strategy (Drake 2013).  Therefore, I examine the 
sensitivity of my results to including proxies for firms’ business strategy (Bentley et al. 2012) 
and life cycle (Dickinson 2011).  My results are robust to the inclusion of these additional 
control variables.  All of my inferences remain the same (i.e., all coefficients of interest retain 
the same sign and level of significance).  Furthermore, business strategy is not a significant 
predictor of firms’ tax strategy choice, and the proxies for life cycle are not statistically 
significant in a consistent manner.            
7.4 Controlling for Influential Tax Strategy Changes 
 Within my sample, firms’ tax strategy choices are relatively stable over time.  There are 
no firms that switch from a sustainable tax strategy to a minimization tax strategy or vice versa, 
but firms do shift in and out of the two tax strategy classifications, usually by moving slightly 
toward the middle of the distribution.  However, examining year-over-year changes reveals 82 
observations that shift more than one quintile of CV_CETR and 260 observations that experience 
a change in CETR3 of more than 10 percent.  I investigate the robustness of my results to these 
potentially influential changes in tax strategy by including two indicator variables in my analysis 
that identify firm-year observations in which a significant shift in sustainability or minimization 
occurred.  Controlling for the 342 observations whose tax strategies appear to have shifted 
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drastically, my inferences are unchanged (i.e., all coefficients of interest retain the same sign and 
level of significance).              
7.5 Factor Analysis  
 Because managerial incentives and practices collectively guide decision-making, they 
are unlikely independent of one another.  Indeed, my analysis indicates that some factors work in 
conjunction with one another, suggesting that a firm’s decision-making policy has two aspects – 
caution and risk-taking.  My analysis in Table 7 accounts for some of the interdependence of the 
proxies by including all four variables simultaneously, but maintains that they are somewhat 
independent as they enter the regression as separate covariates.  To measure the joint effect of 
the incentives and practices and model the caution and risk-taking aspects of decision-making 
policy, I use principal components factor analysis to create two factor scores.  I model caution 
using the factor score from combining DELTA and the reverse-coded measure of INFO 
TRANSFER (CAUTION) and risk-taking using the factor score from combining VEGA and INFO 
TRANSFER (RTAKING).50   
 I exclude TAXEXPERT from the principal components analysis because it is obtained 
through a different process.  Companies have complete control over the incentives provided to 
managers and directors’ connections because they can change the compensation contract and 
hire and fire directors.  In contrast, the company has less control over whether their audit firm is 
a tax expert.  The distribution of tax expertise is driven by audit firm willingness to invest in 
becoming an expert, and the ultimate pairing of audit firm and client depends on many things – 
client needs, conflicts of interest, availability, etc. – only one of which is tax strategy.  Thus, 
                                                 
50 I create the factor scores in this manner because my main analysis suggests that DELTA and INFO 
TRANSFER work oppositely to promote increasing firm value with relatively low risk, while VEGA and 
INFO TRANSFER work together to encourage increasing firm value through relatively more risky 
investments. 
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obtaining expert tax advice follows a different process than providing equity incentives or 
transferring information through director connections.51       
 I examine the effect of CAUTION, RTAKING, and TAXEXPERT by re-estimating 
models (4) and (5) including one factor score and TAXEXPERT.  Accounting for the joint effect 
of managerial incentives and practices, my untabulated analysis suggests that TAXEXPERT and 
RTAKING (CAUTION) positively (negatively) influence the choice of a minimization tax 
strategy, while CAUTION positively influences the choice of a sustainable tax strategy (all p < 
0.05).  Thus, consistent with my main analysis, these results suggest that firms take deliberate 
actions to cultivate decision-making policies that reflect their attitudes toward tax strategies.   
7.6 Nearby Firm Analysis 
 I defined sustainable and minimization tax strategies using portions of the distribution of 
tax behavior observed over time (i.e., lowest quintile of CV_CETR and CETR3 less than or equal 
to 20 percent).  Although my operationalizations are consistent with the conceptual definitions of 
tax strategy, my cut-offs are somewhat arbitrary.  However, if my classification adequately 
represents each tax strategy, I would expect managerial incentives and practices to influence the 
choice of tax strategy differently for firms exhibiting tax behavior close to sustainability or 
minimization (i.e., those firms that lie nearby on the distribution of tax behavior).  To investigate 
this expectation, I re-estimate models (4) and (5) using dependent variables that denote firms 
near the ends of the distribution (i.e., SUSTAIN equals one if the firm is in the second lowest 
quintile of CV_CETR and zero otherwise, while MINIMIZE equals one is the firm has a CETR3 
greater than 20 percent, but less than 30 percent).  I find that none of my proxies for managerial 
incentives and practices are significantly associated with tax strategies close to sustainable or 
                                                 
51 When I include TAXEXPERT in the factor analysis, it loads positively on the factor (0.438), but its 
uniqueness is rather high (0.808), consistent with TAXEXPERT not being fully controlled by the firm.   
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minimization tax strategies.  Consistent with the lack of a clear tax strategy, my results 
(untabulated) indicate that the nearby firms do not behave in the same manner as the firms with 
more salient tax strategies, reiterating the importance of identifying firms that clearly choose a 
tax strategy for examining the determinants of tax strategy choice. 
7.7 CEO Change Analysis 
 Because managerial incentives and practices are determined by the shareholders and 
board of directors, I have implicitly assumed that firms’ strategies are determined by the firm as 
a whole rather than by any one manager.  However, it is possible that a change in CEO could 
result in a significant shift in a firm’s strategy, including its tax strategy, because the CEO can 
exert considerable influence over the firm (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2010; Bertrand and Schoar 2003; 
Bamber et al. 2010).  Therefore, I examine the sensitivity of firms’ tax strategy choices to CEO 
changes.   
 I identify 490 firm-year observations in my sample that experience a change in CEO in 
the prior year.  Approximately ten percent of observations in each tax strategy (sustainable, 
minimization, and mixed) have a CEO change (10.7, 10.4, and 10.5 percent, respectively), 
suggesting that CEO changes are not systematically related to one tax strategy.  I also compare 
the difference in the average change in tax strategy in the year following a change in CEO to the 
average change in tax strategy for all other firm-year observations.  The average change in 
SUSTAIN is 0.139 (0.121) for firm-year observations with (without) a CEO change in the prior 
year, and this difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.26).  Similarly, the average change 
in MINIMIZE is 0.152 (0.149) for firm-year observations with (without) a CEO change in the 
prior year, which is not statistically significantly (p = 0.89).  In addition, there are no firms that 
change from a sustainable tax strategy to a minimization tax strategy, or vice versa, in the year 
following the change in CEO.  Taken together, my results indicate that, in general, CEO changes 
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do not impact firms’ tax strategy choices, consistent with the findings of the business strategy 
literature (Bentley 2013; Higgins et al. 2014).  
7.8 Consistent Expense Analysis 
 The management literature suggests that each individual strategy within the firm is 
chosen to align with the firm’s overarching strategy (Miller 1986; Porter 2004; Zahra and Covin 
1993).  If strategies are aligned, I expect firms that choose a sustainable tax strategy to also 
report consistent levels of other expenses.  Thus, I investigate the variability of two other 
commonly reported expenses, cost of goods sold (COGS) and selling, general, and 
administrative expenses (SG&A), and their association with tax strategy choices.  For each 
observation in my sample, I calculate the coefficient of variation for COGS and SG&A over the 
period t-4 to t and conduct tests of mean and median differences for firms that engage in 
sustainable, mixed, or minimization tax strategies.  My untabulated analysis indicates that firms 
that choose a sustainable tax strategy have significantly lower coefficients of variation for both 
COGS and SG&A than firms that engage in either of the two remaining tax strategies (all p < 
0.01).  These results suggest that firms that emphasize sustainability consistently make decisions 
that result in less volatile expenses, indicating that managers employ similar strategies across the 
entire firm.       
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8. CONCLUSION 
 
 This study examines the managerial incentives and practices associated with firms’ 
decisions to concentrate on a sustainable or minimization tax strategy and their relative 
importance as determinants of firms’ tax strategy choices.  The sustainability dimension strives 
to achieve a consistent tax outcome over time, while the minimization dimension strives to 
achieve the lowest possible tax outcome.  The goal of effective tax planning, and thus tax 
strategy, is to maximize after-tax returns.  Therefore, understanding the determinants of firms’ 
tax strategy choices is important because tax strategy can contribute significantly to firm value, 
but researchers know relatively little about why firms choose their tax strategy.  
 I draw upon prior literature that posits that managerial incentives and practices are 
significant determinants of managers’ decision-making, in general (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 
1976), and tax strategy, specifically (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2008; Mills et al. 1998).  Using a sample 
of firm-year observations from 2000 to 2010, I find that firms are more likely to focus on a 
sustainable tax strategy when the CEO’s wealth is more sensitive to changes in stock price (i.e., 
incentivized to increase firm performance) and less likely to emphasize sustainability when it has 
more access to information through its directors’ connections.  In contrast, firms are more likely 
to concentrate on a minimization tax strategy when the CEO’s wealth is more sensitive to 
changes in stock return volatility (i.e., incentivized to make riskier decisions), when a tax expert 
audit firm provides tax services, or when firms have more access to information through their 
directors’ connections.  Finally, I find that managerial incentives are the most important factors 
for the choice of tax strategy followed by the managerial practices of obtaining expert tax advice 
and information from directors outside of the firm.  Unlike prior literature that documents an 
association between managerial incentives and tax outcomes, I provide evidence that managerial 
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incentives are the most important factor preceding the tax strategy choice, which produces the 
observed tax outcomes.  
 This study contributes to the literature that examines the determinants of corporate tax 
avoidance by investigating two dimensions of tax strategy and the determinants of the 
underlying tax strategy (i.e., the decision to emphasize either a sustainable or minimization tax 
strategy to maximize firm value).  Prior research has sought to explain the variation in tax 
outcomes; however, by examining the factors that likely precede the choice of tax strategy, I 
provide evidence regarding which managerial incentives and practices influence this higher-level 
tax planning decision.  Furthermore, although the prior literature has identified many 
characteristics associated with firms’ tax avoidance, much of the variation in tax outcomes has 
yet to be explained (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Shevlin 2007).  By identifying the determinants 
of tax strategy choice, this study can further explain the variation in observed tax outcomes 
because the tax outcomes depend on firms’ tax strategies.  Finally, my findings may be of 
interest to firms and shareholders because they indicate that managerial incentives and practices 
can be used to influence the choice of tax strategy; thus, shareholders that desire to alter an 
existing strategy or implement a new tax strategy may find these mechanisms useful for 
accomplishing their goal.       
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APPENDIX A 
 
EXAMPLES OF FIRMS WITH SUSTAINABLE AND MINIMIZATION TAX 
STRATEGIES  
APPENDIX TABLE 1A 
Examples of Firms with Sustainable and Minimization Tax Strategies  
Variables  SUSTAIN  MINIMIZE 
  The Coca-Cola Company  PeopleSoft, Inc. 
  
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
CV_CETR 
 
0.124 
 
0.098 
 
0.793 
 
0.881 
CETR3 
 
0.233 
 
0.232 
 
0.099 
 
0.094 
CETR RANGE 
 
0.051 
 
0.047 
 
0.324 
 
0.351 
ROA 
 
0.156 
 
0.162 
 
0.059 
 
0.068 
CV_PTBI 
 
0.106 
 
0.096 
 
0.456 
 
0.451 
  Kimberly-Clark Corp.  Eli Lilly & Co. 
  
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
CV_CETR 
 
0.196 
 
0.214 
 
0.611 
 
0.577 
CETR3 
 
0.239 
 
0.244 
 
0.161 
 
0.134 
CETR RANGE 
 
0.075 
 
0.069 
 
0.178 
 
0.186 
ROA 
 
0.099 
 
0.101 
 
0.121 
 
0.126 
CV_PTBI 
 
0.066 
 
0.050 
 
0.130 
 
0.123 
Means and medians are calculated at the firm-level using all available observations over the sample period.  CV_CETR 
measures the variability of annual cash ETRs.  CETR3 is the firm’s three-year cash ETR.  CETR RANGE is the 
difference between the highest and lowest annual cash ETRs within the three-year cash ETR (CETR3).  ROA is the 
firm’s return-on-assets, and CV_PTBI measures the firm’s earnings volatility.   
 
 
 
 To illustrate the differences in sustainable and minimization tax strategies, Table 1A 
presents additional descriptive statistics for firms identified as following either a sustainable or 
minimization tax strategy.  The mean and median CV_CETR (CETR3) for Coca-Cola and 
Kimberly-Clark (sustainers) are much lower (higher) than those of PeopleSoft and Eli Lilly 
(minimizers), consistent with the definitions of sustainable (minimization) tax strategies.  All 
four firms are profitable (ROA >= 0.06), which implies that each firm likely has a value-
maximizing tax strategy.  However, Coca-Cola’s and Kimberly-Clark’s earnings volatility 
(CV_PTBI) is lower when compared to PeopleSoft and Eli Lilly, consistent with prior literature 
  80 
that finds that firms with sustainable tax strategies have more persistent and less volatile earnings 
(McGuire et al. 2013).  Finally, CETR RANGE, the difference between the highest and lowest 
annual cash ETR within CETR3, is smaller for Coca-Cola and Kimberly-Clark, relative to 
PeopleSoft and Eli Lilly, consistent with firms focusing on sustainability reporting low year-to-
year variability in tax outcomes (Deloitte 2013; KPMG LLP 2007; PwC 2008) while firms 
emphasizing minimization are less concerned about the risk and/or variability of any tax 
activity’s expected outcome. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable  Definition 
Tax Strategies 
SUSTAIN = An indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year observation has a 
coefficient of variation of cash ETRs (CV_CETR) in the lowest quintile for 
the year and equal to zero otherwise. 
MINIMIZE = An indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year observation has a three-
year cash ETR (CETR3) less than or equal to 20 percent and equal to zero 
otherwise. 
MIXED = An indicator variable equal to one if both SUSTAIN and MINIMIZE equal 
zero for the firm-year observation and equal to zero otherwise.  
CV_CETR = The standard deviation of annual cash ETRs for the five-year period prior 
to and including the current year (t to t-4) scaled by the absolute value of 
the mean of annual cash ETRs over the same five-year period. 
CETR3 = The ratio of the sum of cash taxes paid (TXPD) divided by the sum of pre-
tax book income less special items (PI-SPI) measured over the three-year 
period, t to t-2. 
Managerial Incentives/Practices 
   
DELTA = The change in the CEO’s wealth for a one percent change in the firm’s 
stock price, following Core and Guay (1999). 
VEGA = The change in value of the CEO’s stock option portfolio for a one percent 
change in stock return volatility, following Core (1999). 
TAXEXPERT = An indicator variable equal to one if the audit firm has a tax service market 
share equal to 30 percent (25 percent) or more in years 2003 or later (2002 
and earlier) within a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and industry and 
equal to zero otherwise, following McGuire et al. (2012). 
INFO 
TRANSFER 
= The factor score of a vector of four director centrality (connectivity) 
measures, NUM_CONNECTIONS, CONTROL, SPEED, and 
CONNECTION_STRENGTH.  NUM_CONNECTIONS is the number of 
unique connections a director has with other directors in the network.  
CONTROL is calculated as the number of paths between two individuals in 
the network, a and b, that pass through individual i divided by the total 
number of paths between the two individuals, a and b.  SPEED is the 
inverse of the sum of the shortest distances of the paths between the 
director and the other directors in the network.  
CONNECTION_STRENGTH is measured as the number of unique 
connections a director has with other directors, but weights each of these 
connections based upon how well-connected those directors are within the 
network. 
(continued on next page) 
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VARIABLE DEFINITIONS (continued) 
Variable  Definition 
Tax Planning 
   
SIZE = The natural logarithm of sales (SALE) plus one. 
LEVERAGE = The ratio of total long-term debt (DLTT) to end-of-the-year total assets (AT). 
PPE = The ratio of property, plant, and equipment (PPE) to end-of-the-year total 
assets (AT). 
FOR_OP = An indicator variable equal to one if foreign income (PIFO) is greater than 
zero and equal to zero otherwise. 
TLCF = An indicator variable equal to one if tax loss carryforward (TLCF) is greater 
than zero and equal to zero otherwise. 
SEGMENTS = The sum of the number of business (BUSSEG) and operating (OPSEG) 
segments reported during the year. 
Performance 
CV_PTBI = The standard deviation of annual pre-tax book income (PI-SPI) for the five-
year period prior to and including the current year (t to t-4) scaled by the 
absolute value of the mean of annual pre-tax book income over the same five-
year period. 
ROA = The ratio of income before extraordinary items (IB) to average total assets 
(AT). 
BTM = The ratio of total common equity (CEQ) to market value of equity 
(PRCC_F*CSHO). 
Investing/Reporting  
RD = The ratio of research and development expense (XRD) to beginning-of-the-
year total assets (AT). 
DISC_ACC = The signed value of the error term from the regression of total accruals ((IBt-
OANCFt)/ATt-1) on the inverse of beginning-of-the-year total assets (1/ATt-1), 
the change in sales adjusted for the change in receivables (((SALEt-SALEt-1)-
(RECTt-RECTt-1))/ATt-1), current year property, plant, and equipment 
(PPENTt/ATt-1), and prior year return on assets, all scaled by beginning of the 
year total assets ((NIt-1/ATt-2)/ATt-1), calculated using the modified Jones 
(1991) model as modified by Kothari et al. (2005). 
   
IMR = The inverse Mills ratio calculated from coefficient estimates from model (3). 
(continued on next page) 
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VARIABLE DEFINITIONS (continued) 
Variable  Definition 
Additional Controls for Selection Model  
TAXSERVICE = An indicator variable equal to one if the client purchased tax services 
from their external audit firm and equal to zero otherwise.   
TENURE = The length of the audit firm’s tenure with the client. 
INSTOWN = The percentage of common shares outstanding owned by institutions at 
the beginning of the year. 
MERGER = An indicator variable equal to one if the firm engaged in any merger or 
acquisition activity (AQP not equal to missing) during the year and equal 
to zero otherwise.   
AUDIND = The auditor’s independence from the client calculated as non-audit fees 
less tax service fees received from the client scaled by total audit fees 
received from the client. 
LNAUDITFEES = The natural logarithm of audit fees received from the client.  
OPPORTUNITY = The market value of the client scaled by the sum of the market values of 
all clients in the same Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and industry. 
ΔTLCF = The change in the value of the tax loss carryforward (TLCF) from year t-
1 to year t scaled by beginning-of-the-year total assets (AT).  
EQINC = The equity income of the client (ESUB) scaled by beginning-of-the-year 
total assets (AT). 
CASH = The cash and cash equivalents (CHE) scaled by beginning-of-the-year 
total assets (AT). 
DEP = The depreciation and amortization expense (DP) scaled by beginning-of-
the-year total assets (AT). 
BIG4 = An indicator variable equal to one if the client is audited by a Big 4 
accounting firm and equal to zero otherwise. 
SECTIER = An indicator variable equal to one if the client is audited by either Grant 
Thornton or BDO Seidman and equal to zero otherwise. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
 
TABLES 
 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample 
Variable N Mean Std Dev 25% Median 75% Minimum Maximum 
Tax Strategies 
SUSTAIN 4668 0.327 0.469 0 0 1 0 1 
MINIMIZE 4668 0.356 0.479 0 0 1 0 1 
CV_CETR 4668 0.584 0.439 0.251 0.456 0.805 0.063 2.175 
CETR3 4668 0.246 0.144 0.156 0.244 0.321 0 1 
Managerial Incentives/Practices 
DELTA 4668 654.948 1684.490 56.333 164.265 484.487 0.237 12496.130 
VEGA 4668 106.356 236.986 0 0 94.084 0 1374.020 
TAXEXPERT 4668 0.568 0.495 0 1 1 0 1 
INFO 
TRANSFER 
4668 0.000 1.000 -0.716 -0.239 0.526 -1.593 4.249 
Tax Planning 
SIZE 4668 7.796 1.444 6.764 7.623 8.694 4.725 11.495 
LEVERAGE 4668 0.172 0.140 0.041 0.160 0.265 0 0.578 
PPE 4668 0.257 0.200 0.108 0.196 0.349 0.021 0.866 
FOR_OP 4668 0.136 0.343 0 0 0 0 1 
TLCF 4668 0.472 0.499 0 0 1 0 1 
SEGMENTS 4668 3.542 2.400 1 3 5 1 21 
Performance 
CV_PTBI 4668 0.562 0.892 0.187 0.329 0.566 0.050 6.850 
ROA 4668 0.071 0.061 0.036 0.066 0.102 -0.140 0.275 
BTM 4668 0.465 0.299 0.257 0.401 0.597 -0.015 1.679 
Investing/Reporting 
RD 4668 0.030 0.047 0 0.006 0.041 0 0.215 
DISC_ACC 4668 0.052 0.093 -0.003 0.044 0.106 -0.220 0.327 
         
IMR 4668 0.376 0.109 0.311 0.338 0.388 0.288 0.798 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics by Tax Strategy – 
SUSTAIN 
(1,526 observations) 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics by Tax Strategy – 
MIXED 
(1,667 observations) 
Panel D: Descriptive Statistics by Tax Strategy – 
MINIMIZE 
(1,662 observations) 
Variable Mean Std Dev 25% Median 75% Mean Std Dev 25% Median 75% Mean Std Dev 25% Median 75% 
Tax Strategies   
CV_CETR 0.19 0.07 0.14 0.19 0.25 0.63 0.29 0.40 0.56 0.79 0.86 0.50 0.46 0.75 1.16 
CETR3 0.29 0.08 0.24 0.29 0.34 0.33 0.15 0.24 0.29 0.37 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.16 
Managerial Incentives/Practices   
DELTA 872.67 2066.32 74.55 210.36 660.71 488.52 1355.51 43.81 126.24 368.39 674.55 1665.16 61.96 185.24 546.37 
VEGA 124.13 262.40 0 0 119.64 81.99 202.71 0 0 65.73 125.17 259.88 0 0 121.26 
TAXEXPERT 0.60 0.49 0 1 1 0.54 0.50 0 1 1 0.58 0.49 0 1 1 
INFO 
TRANSFER 
0.17 1.03 -0.61 -0.03 0.76 -0.09 0.99 -0.79 -0.29 0.37 -0.02 1.00 -0.74 -0.27 0.52 
Tax Planning   
SIZE 8.26 1.43 7.22 8.18 9.21 7.66 1.37 6.65 7.49 8.54 7.60 1.46 6.60 7.47 8.48 
LEVERAGE 0.17 0.13 0.06 0.16 0.25 0.17 0.14 0.04 0.16 0.27 0.18 0.15 0.03 0.16 0.28 
PPE 0.26 0.18 0.13 0.21 0.34 0.25 0.19 0.11 0.21 0.35 0.26 0.23 0.09 0.18 0.37 
FOR_OP 0.14 0.35 0 0 0 0.13 0.33 0 0 0 0.15 0.36 0 0 0 
TLCF 0.41 0.49 0 0 1 0.48 0.50 0 0 1 0.52 0.50 0 1 1 
SEGMENTS 3.65 2.33 1 3 5 3.63 2.53 1 3 5 3.44 2.34 1 3 5 
Performance   
CV_PTBI 0.24 0.15 0.14 0.21 0.32 0.56 0.76 0.23 0.38 0.60 0.82 1.22 0.24 0.43 0.78 
ROA 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.09 
BTM 0.39 0.25 0.22 0.34 0.51 0.52 0.32 0.31 0.46 0.66 0.47 0.30 0.25 0.41 0.61 
Investing/Reporting   
RD 0.02 0.03 0 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.05 0 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.06 0 0.02 0.07 
DISC_ACC 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.10 -0.01 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.11 
                
IMR 0.36 0.10 0.31 0.33 0.37 0.39 0.11 0.32 0.35 0.40 0.37 0.11 0.31 0.33 0.39 
Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions.  
All variables except SUSTAIN, MINIMIZE, MIXED, CETR3, TAXEXPERT, FOR_OP, TLCF, SEGMENTS, and IMR have been winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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TABLE 2 
Correlations 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Tax Strategies                     
(1) SUSTAIN 1 
                  
 
(2) MINIMIZE -0.34 1 
                 
 
(3) CV_CETR -0.62 0.46 1 
                
 
(4) CETR3 0.20 -0.70 -0.35 1 
               
 
Managerial 
Incentives/Practices 
                    
(5) DELTA 0.09 0.01 -0.08 -0.01 1 
              
 
(6) VEGA 0.05 0.06 -0.03 -0.05 0.26 1 
             
 
(7) TAXEXPERT 0.05 0.02 -0.04 -0.00 0.04 -0.04 1 
            
 
(8) INFO 
TRANSFER 
0.12 -0.02 -0.13 0.01 0.11 0.40 0.05 1 
           
 
Tax Planning                     
(9) SIZE 0.22 -0.10 -0.28 0.07 0.23 0.28 0.18 0.55 1 
          
 
(10) LEVERAGE -0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.16 0.17 1 
         
 
(11) PPE -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.07 0.11 0.25 1 
        
 
(12) FOR_OP 0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.18 -0.13 0.10 0.06 0.06 -0.01 1 
       
 
(13) TLCF -0.09 0.07 0.10 -0.09 -0.04 -0.06 0.04 -0.05 0.00 0.07 -0.14 0.00 1 
      
 
(14) SEGMENTS 0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.27 0.29 0.13 -0.03 0.12 0.09 1 
     
 
Performance                     
(15) CV_PTBI -0.25 0.21 0.51 -0.13 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.12 -0.22 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.05 -0.06 1 
    
 
(16) ROA 0.25 -0.07 -0.24 -0.02 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.26 -0.03 -0.03 -0.12 -0.08 -0.10 1 
   
 
(17) BTM -0.18 0.01 0.16 0.06 -0.15 -0.20 -0.07 -0.18 -0.09 0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.06 0.02 0.09 -0.49 1 
  
 
Investing/Reporting                     
(18) RD -0.16 0.22 0.21 -0.19 0.03 0.08 -0.02 -0.09 -0.22 -0.25 -0.31 -0.01 0.07 -0.12 0.18 0.12 -0.21 1 
 
 
(19) DISC_ACC 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.11 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.22 -0.08 0.15 1  
(20) IMR -0.08 -0.02 0.06 0.05 -0.01 0.04 -0.41 -0.13 -0.25 0.01 0.13 0.19 -0.13 -0.10 0.06 -0.04 0.13 -0.05 -0.06 1 
All coefficients in bold are significant at at least the 5% significance level.  
Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions.  
All variables except SUSTAIN, MINIMIZE, MIXED, CETR3, TAXEXPERT, FOR_OP, TLCF, SEGMENTS, and IMR have been winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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TABLE 3  
Equity Incentives - Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Probit Regression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES SUSTAIN MINIMIZE SUSTAIN MINIMIZE 
      
Marginal 
Effects 
Marginal 
Effects 
Managerial Incentives/Practices 
DELTA 0.000048 0.000004 0.000009 -0.000002 
 
3.281*** 0.270 2.900*** -0.57 
VEGA -0.000135 0.000353 -0.000053 0.000097 
 
-1.347 3.857*** -2.41*** 3.88*** 
Tax Planning   
  
SIZE 0.125707 -0.021287 0.026248 -0.012998 
 6.254*** -1.195 6.14**** -2.69*** 
LEVERAGE -0.543732 0.464511 -0.141229 0.149398 
 -2.755*** 2.722*** -3.37*** 3.22*** 
PPE -0.351761 0.565438 -0.111067 0.162933 
 -1.847* 3.380*** -2.72*** 3.58*** 
FOR_OP -0.070417 0.049359 -0.017329 0.016792 
 -1.058 0.830 -1.23 1.01 
TLCF -0.150085 0.116323 -0.038148 0.038440 
 -3.200*** 2.790*** -3.88*** 3.28*** 
SEGMENTS 0.000754 -0.005026 0.000522 -0.001304 
 
0.070 -0.527 0.22 -0.50 
Performance   
  
CV_PTBI -2.547150 0.242495 -0.517806 0.216115 
 -19.610*** 9.066*** -24.83*** 19.11*** 
ROA 5.675769 -0.976894 1.186278 -0.590808 
 10.588*** -2.320** 10.89*** -5.14*** 
BTM -0.151029 0.005820 -0.030066 0.010673 
 -1.449 0.070 -1.38 0.47 
Investing/Reporting   
  
RD -7.190267 4.282788 -1.729298 1.510307 
 -9.559*** 7.757*** -11.31*** 10.02*** 
DISC_ACC 0.151220 -0.901739 0.096839 -0.234732 
 0.507 -3.502*** 1.53 -3.36*** 
Constant -0.467221 -1.082376   
 
-0.670 -1.484   
   
  
LR Test of 
Independence 247.93 p < 0.01 
  
Observations 4,668 4,668   
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. 
Each regression model is estimated with industry fixed effects (two-digit SIC code). 
All variables except SUSTAIN, MINIMIZE, FOR_OP, TLCF, and SEGMENTS have been winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. 
The estimate of the correlation among the equation error terms is -0.523 and significant at the 1% level.  
Columns (3) and (4) present the bivariate marginal probability effects of each covariate on the probability of the 
dependent variable equaling one (i.e., of the firm adopting either a sustainable or minimization tax strategy).  
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TABLE 4  
Selection Model – Probability of Purchasing Auditor Provided Tax 
Services  
VARIABLES TAXSERVICE 
TENURE 0.063771 
 
4.768*** 
INSTOWN 0.078532 
 
0.458 
MERGER 0.070882 
 0.880 
AUDIND -0.481663 
 -6.993*** 
LNAUDITFEES 0.312227 
 6.550*** 
OPPORTUNITY -0.053622 
 -0.707 
SIZE 0.071147 
 1.993** 
LEVERAGE 0.282233 
 1.347 
PPE -0.299404 
 -1.234 
FOR_OP 0.006800 
 
0.083 
TLCF 0.025187 
 0.479 
DISC_ACC 1.134289 
 3.577*** 
ΔTLCF 0.046035 
 0.074 
EQINC -3.937517 
 -0.781 
RD 0.838394 
 1.135 
BTM -0.201206 
 -1.995** 
ROA -0.540619 
 -1.016 
CASH 0.176826 
 0.906 
DEP 1.683956 
 1.139 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
VARIABLES TAXSERVICE 
BIG4 0.068127 
 0.478 
SECTIER -0.521715 
 -2.705*** 
Constant -4.748557 
 -5.821*** 
Area under the ROC Curve 0.827 
Observations 4,668 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. 
The logistic regression model is estimated with industry (two-digit SIC code) and year fixed effects. 
All variables except TAXSERVICE, TENURE, MERGER, FOR_OP, TLCF, BIG4, and SECTIER have been winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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TABLE 5  
Expert Tax Advice - Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Probit Regression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES SUSTAIN MINIMIZE SUSTAIN MINIMIZE 
      Marginal Effects Marginal Effects 
Managerial Incentives/Practices 
TAXEXPERT -0.043345 0.103329 -0.015067 0.033290 
 
-0.859 2.295** -1.49 2.86*** 
Tax Planning   
  
SIZE 0.131879 -0.016928 0.027607 -0.011001 
 6.558*** -0.958 6.69*** -2.37** 
LEVERAGE -0.590497 0.441209 -0.149541 0.146366 
 -3.006*** 2.595*** -3.57*** 3.16*** 
PPE -0.359739 0.641811 -0.121572 0.177861 
 -1.872* 3.809*** -2.97*** 3.90*** 
FOR_OP -0.064533 0.131134 -0.023410 0.033251 
 -0.950 2.157** -1.69* 1.99** 
TLCF -0.154694 0.091737 -0.036813 0.033984 
 -3.277*** 2.192** -3.74*** 2.91*** 
SEGMENTS -0.000226 -0.004405 0.000202 -0.001126 
 
-0.021 -0.462 0.09 -0.43 
Performance   
  
CV_PTBI -2.524860 0.246306 -0.515703 0.216624 
 -19.487*** 9.167*** -24.72*** 19.11*** 
ROA 5.681235 -0.936214 1.187869 -0.591618 
 10.598*** -2.223** 10.88*** -5.15*** 
BTM -0.168724 -0.007282 -0.032713 0.005846 
 -1.629 -0.087 -1.51 0.26 
Investing/Reporting  
  
RD -7.113835 4.517586 -1.739652 1.562638 
 -9.524*** 8.239*** -11.42*** 10.44*** 
DISC_ACC 0.132604 -0.942961 0.095920 -0.239901 
 0.444 -3.660*** 1.51 -3.43*** 
IMR -0.224824 -0.325093   
 -0.863 -1.434   
Constant -0.370059 -1.014474   
 
-0.515 -1.355   
   
  
LR Test of 
Independence 226.01 p < 0.01 
  
Observations 4,668 4,668   
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. 
Each regression model is estimated with industry fixed effects (two-digit SIC code).  
All variables except SUSTAIN, MINIMIZE, TAXEXPERT, FOR_OP, TLCF, SEGMENTS, and IMR have been winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
The estimate of the correlation among the equation error terms is -0.521 and significant at the 1% level.  
Columns (3) and (4) present the bivariate marginal probability effects of each covariate on the probability of the dependent 
variable equaling one (i.e., of the firm adopting either a sustainable or minimization tax strategy).  These effects are 
estimated for the model without the inclusion of IMR because marginal effects cannot be estimated for factor variables. 
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TABLE 6  
Information Transfer through Directors - Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Probit 
Regression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES SUSTAIN MINIMIZE SUSTAIN MINIMIZE 
      
Marginal 
Effects 
Marginal 
Effects 
Managerial Incentives/Practices 
INFO TRANSFER -0.071798 0.065220 -0.018967 0.020735 
 
-2.535** 2.590*** -3.12*** 3.02*** 
Tax Planning   
  
SIZE 0.160496 -0.025554 0.033414 -0.016242 
 7.376*** -1.342 7.25*** -3.14*** 
LEVERAGE -0.564252 0.425070 -0.142519 0.141053 
 -2.869*** 2.502** -3.41*** 3.05*** 
PPE -0.349133 0.563370 -0.110627 0.162492 
 -1.836* 3.369*** -2.71*** 3.57*** 
FOR_OP -0.063737 0.081308 -0.018450 0.024582 
 -0.972 1.386 -1.33 1.49 
TLCF -0.156515 0.111278 -0.039097 0.037637 
 -3.344*** 2.672*** -3.98*** 3.21*** 
SEGMENTS 0.001677 -0.006729 0.000832 -0.001788 
 
0.155 -0.703 0.36 -0.69 
Performance   
  
CV_PTBI -2.543110 0.246214 -0.517596 0.217612 
 -19.576*** 9.188*** -24.79*** 19.18*** 
ROA 5.597580 -0.935224 1.168668 -0.577440 
 10.440*** -2.223** 10.70*** -5.02*** 
BTM -0.212660 -0.004659 -0.041396 0.011874 
 -2.031** -0.056 -1.89* 0.52 
Investing/Reporting  
  
RD -7.108170 4.525143 -1.733420 1.569134 
 -9.531*** 8.255*** -11.41*** 10.48*** 
DISC_ACC 0.158554 -0.936518 0.100873 -0.243905 
 0.531 -3.637*** 1.59 -3.48*** 
Constant -0.749225 -1.002369   
 
-1.067 -1.368   
   
  
LR Test of 
Independence 247.39 p < 0.01 
  
Observations 4,668 4,668   
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. 
Each regression model is estimated with industry fixed effects (two-digit SIC code). 
All variables except SUSTAIN, MINIMIZE, FOR_OP, TLCF, and SEGMENTS have been winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. 
The estimate of the correlation among the equation error terms is -0.520 and significant at the 1% level.  
Columns (3) and (4) present the bivariate marginal probability effects of each covariate on the probability of the 
dependent variable equaling one (i.e., of the firm adopting either a sustainable or minimization tax strategy). 
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TABLE 7  
Managerial Incentives and Practices - Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Probit Regression 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES SUSTAIN MINIMIZE 
Managerial Incentives/Practices 
DELTA 0.164 0.022 
 
3.106*** 0.478 
VEGA -0.035 0.167 
 
-0.667 3.564*** 
TAXEXPERT -0.058 0.116 
 -1.091 2.492** 
INFO TRANSFER -0.136 0.095 
 -2.157** 1.732* 
Tax Planning   
SIZE 0.443 -0.164 
 6.173*** -2.642*** 
LEVERAGE -0.155 0.138 
 -2.626*** 2.766*** 
PPE -0.137 0.262 
 -1.669* 3.726*** 
FOR_OP -0.046 0.069 
 -0.913 1.560 
TLCF -0.167 0.112 
 -3.310*** 2.548** 
SEGMENTS 0.018 -0.035 
 
0.323 -0.718 
Performance   
CV_PTBI -4.864 0.449 
 -19.550*** 8.965*** 
ROA 0.732 -0.110 
 10.424*** -2.039** 
BTM -0.117 0.039 
 -1.719* 0.734 
Investing/Reporting   
RD -0.714 0.420 
 -9.530*** 7.788*** 
DISC_ACC 0.035 -0.189 
 0.595 -3.748*** 
IMR -0.058 -0.091 
 -0.955 -1.753* 
   LR Test of Independence 224.43 p < 0.01 
Observations 4,668 4,668 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. 
Fully standardized coefficient estimates are reported. 
Each regression model is estimated with industry fixed effects (two-digit SIC code). 
All variables except SUSTAIN, MINIMIZE, FOR_OP, TLCF, SEGMENTS, and IMR have been winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles. 
The estimate of the correlation among the equation error terms is -0.522 (p < 0.01).  
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TABLE 8  
Matched Firm Analysis  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES SUSTAIN SUSTAIN SUSTAIN SUSTAIN 
Managerial Incentives/Practices 
DELTA 0.000145 
 
 0.000137 
 
3.557*** 
 
 3.327*** 
VEGA -0.000319 
 
 -0.000256 
 
-1.326 
 
 -1.016 
TAXEXPERT  -0.263668  -0.288373 
  -2.013**  -2.192** 
INFO TRANSFER   -0.166700 -0.153725 
   -2.348** -2.062** 
Tax Planning   
  
SIZE -0.051347 0.040522 0.042139 0.062310 
 -0.968 0.770 0.747 1.017 
LEVERAGE -1.842887 -2.199707 -2.021507 -1.956720 
 -3.579*** -4.273*** -3.952*** -3.769*** 
PPE -0.850532 -1.127290 -0.765173 -1.019456 
 -1.716* -2.272** -1.551 -2.031** 
FOR_OP -0.217921 -0.378017 -0.183183 -0.357435 
 -1.306 -2.234** -1.113 -2.079** 
TLCF -0.220042 -0.175528 -0.244288 -0.176008 
 -1.840* -1.464 -2.056** -1.453 
SEGMENTS -0.005683 -0.009122 -0.003918 0.000307 
 
-0.196 -0.314 -0.135 0.010 
Performance   
  
CV_PTBI -5.298183 -5.275233 -5.183406 -5.483688 
 -14.941*** -15.038*** -14.923*** -15.120*** 
ROA 12.324620 12.088076 11.995359 11.992319 
 8.037*** 7.889*** 7.886*** 7.748*** 
BTM -0.287562 -0.488319 -0.496883 -0.483626 
 -1.022 -1.750* -1.773* -1.676* 
Investing/Reporting   
  
RD -17.759347 -17.865106 -17.456647 -17.975716 
 -9.585*** -9.678*** -9.480*** -9.715*** 
DISC_ACC 1.019789 0.789634 0.908616 0.962777 
 1.271 0.990 1.141 1.193 
IMR  1.906891  1.888581 
  2.674***  2.615*** 
   
  
Pseudo R-Square 0.328 0.328 0.324 0.335 
Observations 1,998 1,998 1,998 1,998 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. 
Each logistic regression model is estimated with industry fixed effects (two-digit SIC code). 
The sample consists of 999 unique pairs of sustainable and minimization tax strategy firms that have been matched on SIZE 
within both industry (Fama French 17 classification) and year without replacement. 
All variables except SUSTAIN, MINIMIZE, FOR_OP, TLCF, SEGMENTS, and IMR have been winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. 
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TABLE 9 
Firm Value Analysis – Univariate Comparisons 
Panel A: Market Value of Equity Comparison of SUSTAIN and MIXED Tax Strategies  
 
Firm Value - SUSTAIN 
 
Firm Value - MIXED 
 
Tests of Mean and Median 
Differences 
Variable Mean 
Std 
Dev 25% Median 75% 
 
Mean 
Std 
Dev 25% Median 75% 
 
Mean 
Difference 
(t)  
Median 
Difference 
(Chi-
Square) 
MVE 1.677 1.060 0.909 1.413 2.164 
 
1.272 0.952 0.634 1.004 1.610 
 
11.37***  135.61*** 
MVEt+1 1.593 1.004 0.868 1.340 2.059 
 
1.218 0.890 0.610 0.973 1.557 
 
11.05***  132.44*** 
MVEt+2 1.536 0.954 0.821 1.315 1.990 1.190 0.838 0.598 0.960 1.542 10.60***  97.31*** 
MVEt+3 1.515 0.922 0.836 1.295 1.960  1.206 0.851 0.610 0.971 1.556  8.81***  84.43*** 
                
Panel B: Market Value of Equity Comparison of MINIMIZE and MIXED Tax Strategies 
 
Firm Value - MINIMIZE 
 
Firm Value - MIXED 
 
Tests of Mean and Median 
Differences 
Variable Mean 
Std 
Dev 25% Median 75% 
 
Mean 
Std 
Dev 25% Median 75% 
 
Mean 
Difference 
(t)  
Median 
Difference 
(Chi-
Square) 
MVE 1.468 1.105 0.717 1.139 1.830 
 
1.272 0.952 0.634 1.004 1.610 
 
5.47***  21.41*** 
MVEt+1 1.367 0.985 0.674 1.079 1.748 
 
1.218 0.890 0.610 0.973 1.557 
 
4.50***  14.25*** 
MVEt+2 1.320 0.961 0.632 1.047 1.677 1.190 0.838 0.598 0.960 1.542 4.00***  6.89*** 
MVEt+3 1.326 0.966 0.651 1.061 1.671  1.206 0.851 0.610 0.971 1.556  3.33***  6.55*** 
                
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. 
Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions.  
MVE has been scaled by total assets and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.   
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TABLE 10  
Forward Tax Strategy Analysis – Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Probit Regression  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES SUSTAINt+1 MINIMIZEt+1 SUSTAINt+2 MINIMIZEt+2 SUSTAINt+4 MINIMIZEt+2 
Managerial Incentives/Practices 
  
DELTA 0.000002 0.000005 0.000063 -0.000005 0.000032 -0.000005 
 0.166 0.393 2.810*** -0.267 1.628* -0.257 
VEGA -0.000224 0.000311 -0.000065 0.000371 0.000090 0.000364 
 -2.206*** 3.245*** -0.513 3.100*** 0.756 3.049*** 
TAXEXPERT -0.048228 0.082673 -0.198696 0.073670 -0.115294 0.066939 
 -1.003 1.848** -2.808*** 1.124 -1.734** 1.022 
INFO TRANSFER -0.040084 0.032016 -0.016532 0.014709 0.037472 0.017573 
 
-1.428* 1.231 -0.438 0.424 1.058 0.507 
Tax Planning   
    
SIZE 0.173822 -0.048780 0.154758 -0.045467 0.064994 -0.047471 
 7.833*** -2.380** 4.765*** -1.534 2.154** -1.601 
LEVERAGE -0.358385 0.770247 -0.840552 1.387439 -0.992094 1.420929 
 -1.952* 4.563*** -2.920*** 5.418*** -3.674*** 5.570*** 
PPE -0.601587 0.574184 -0.791994 1.218991 -0.768365 1.194569 
 -3.261*** 3.413*** -2.936*** 4.969*** -3.077*** 4.890*** 
FOR_OP -0.079428 0.067136 -0.180098 -0.013895 -0.005530 -0.007018 
 -1.190 1.102 -2.169** -0.183 -0.071 -0.093 
TLCF -0.045357 0.103721 -0.156667 0.081377 -0.128125 0.078969 
 -1.004 2.487** -2.374** 1.355 -2.084** 1.316 
SEGMENTS -0.011206 -0.010386 -0.015932 0.021936 -0.018643 0.019675 
 
-1.094 -1.092 -1.085 1.692* -1.382 1.517 
Performance   
    
CV_PTBI -0.044150 0.233203 -1.709615 0.173073 -0.319755 0.168786 
 -1.519 8.756*** -11.974*** 4.703*** -5.372*** 4.669*** 
ROA 5.386372 -1.452036 7.792268 -2.805425 4.065492 -2.691054 
 11.247*** -3.482*** 9.858*** -4.491*** 5.982*** -4.341*** 
BTM -0.623105 0.130326 -0.605978 0.316313 -1.400404 0.327692 
 -6.025*** 1.543 -3.741*** 2.539** -8.420*** 2.640*** 
Investing/Reporting   
    
RD -4.977988 4.092803 -8.506942 5.243290 -8.434661 5.239593 
 -7.605*** 7.464*** -8.123*** 6.577*** -8.966*** 6.581*** 
DISC_ACC 0.318981 -0.627849 0.180065 -0.649183 -0.804319 -0.630932 
 1.147 -2.460** 0.443 -1.772* -2.133** -1.733* 
IMR -0.146904 -0.448304 -0.460625 0.370471 -0.695999 0.365001 
 -0.597 -1.989** -1.534 1.394 -2.471** 1.374 
Constant -6.423079 -0.701420 -5.782893 -6.789121 -4.788942 -6.756131 
 
-0.008 -0.925 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
   
    
LR Test of 
Independence 223.60 p < 0.01 98.29 p < 0.01 109.69 p < 0.01 
Observations 4,663 4,663 2,525 2,525 2,525 2,525 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.  Significance is reported based on one-tailed tests.  
Each regression model is estimated with industry fixed effects (two-digit SIC code). 
All variables except SUSTAIN, MINIMIZE, FOR_OP, TLCF, SEGMENTS, and IMR have been winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. 
The estimate of the correlation among the equation error terms is negative and significant at the 1% level in each set of 
regression models.  
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TABLE 11  
GAAP ETR Tax Strategy Analysis – Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Probit Regression 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES SUSTAIN MINIMIZE 
Managerial Incentives/Practices 
DELTA 0.082 -0.085 
 
1.308 -0.877 
VEGA 0.066 0.006 
 
0.864 0.066 
TAXEXPERT -0.041 0.171 
 -0.506 1.995** 
INFO TRANSFER -0.402 0.184 
 -4.271*** 1.851* 
Tax Planning   
SIZE 0.537 -0.180 
 5.363*** -1.651* 
LEVERAGE -0.157 0.355 
 -1.866* 4.066*** 
PPE -0.337 0.167 
 -3.692*** 1.689* 
FOR_OP -0.098 -0.044 
 -1.294 -0.539 
TLCF -0.382 0.214 
 -5.029*** 2.688*** 
SEGMENTS 0.048 -0.249 
 
0.584 -2.859*** 
Performance   
CV_PTBI -6.963 0.721 
 -15.602*** 9.768*** 
ROA 1.438 -0.208 
 12.365*** -2.249** 
BTM -0.195 0.711 
 -1.873* 2.621*** 
Investing/Reporting   
RD -1.126 0.237 
 -9.651*** 8.337*** 
DISC_ACC -0.003 -0.218 
 -0.035 -2.626*** 
IMR 0.007 -0.036 
 0.082 -0.385 
LR Test of Independence 95.11 p < 0.01 
Observations 2,948 2,948 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. 
Fully standardized coefficient estimates are reported. 
Each regression model is estimated with industry fixed effects (Fama French 17). 
All variables except SUSTAIN, MINIMIZE, FOR_OP, TLCF, SEGMENTS, and IMR have been winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. The estimate of the correlation among the equation error terms is -0.810 (p < 0.01). 
To be defined as following a tax strategy, firms must be classified as following a sustainable or minimization tax strategy 
using both cash and GAAP ETRs. Observations that are classified as following a tax strategy using cash ETR, but not 
GAAP ETR are removed from the sample.  
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TABLE 12 
Mixed Tax Strategy Analysis – Univariate Comparisons 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics Comparison of SUSTAIN versus MIXED Tax Strategies  
 
Descriptive Statistics by Tax Strategy - 
SUSTAIN 
 
Descriptive Statistics by Tax Strategy - MIXED 
 
Tests of Mean and Median 
Differences 
Variable Mean 
Std 
Dev 25% Median 75% 
 
Mean 
Std 
Dev 25% Median 75% 
 
Mean 
Difference 
(t)  
Median 
Difference 
(Chi-
Square) 
Tax Strategies 
 
 
 
 
CV_CETR 0.191 0.072 0.136 0.192 0.248 
 
0.634 0.294 0.402 0.56 0.791 
 
-57.28***  2600*** 
CETR3 0.287 0.078 0.235 0.291 0.341 
 
0.334 0.148 0.243 0.292 0.365 
 
-11.10***  0.09 
Managerial Incentives/Practices 
 
 
 
 
DELTA 872.666 2066.32 74.551 210.362 660.713 
 
488.517 1355.51 43.813 126.24 368.389 
 
6.26***  56.14*** 
VEGA 124.134 262.404 0 0 119.636 
 
81.993 202.712 0 0 65.729 
 
5.10***  4.55** 
TAXEXPERT 0.603 0.489 0 1 1 
 
0.537 0.499 0 1 1 
 
3.77***  0.03 
INFO 
TRANSFER 
0.166 1.025 -0.608 -0.033 0.757 
 
-0.094 0.986 -0.792 -0.294 0.371 
 
7.30***  39.54*** 
Tax Planning 
 
 
 
 
SIZE 8.256 1.432 7.218 8.175 9.205 
 
7.657 1.37 6.647 7.492 8.541 
 
12.06***  98.04*** 
LEVERAGE 0.166 0.129 0.056 0.158 0.25 
 
0.173 0.14 0.041 0.16 0.265 
 
-1.44  0.05 
PPE 0.255 0.179 0.129 0.21 0.339 
 
0.254 0.191 0.109 0.205 0.347 
 
0.24  0.23 
FOR_OP 0.138 0.345 0 0 0 
 
0.126 0.332 0 0 0 
 
1.03  0.95 
TLCF 0.407 0.491 0 0 1 
 
0.481 0.5 0 0 1 
 
-4.22***  17.44*** 
SEGMENTS 3.649 2.333 1 3 5 
 
3.631 2.531 1 3 5 
 
0.21  2.70* 
Performance 
 
 
 
 
CV_PTBI 0.244 0.15 0.138 0.206 0.319 
 
0.562 0.759 0.227 0.383 0.602 
 
-16.08***  388.75*** 
ROA 0.093 0.054 0.058 0.089 0.122 
 
0.059 0.061 0.028 0.055 0.088 
 
16.80***  269.63*** 
BTM 0.386 0.245 0.217 0.336 0.506 
 
0.523 0.321 0.31 0.455 0.661 
 
-13.50***  135.47*** 
Investing/Reporting 
 
 
 
 
RD 0.019 0.032 0 0.001 0.025 
 
0.027 0.045 0 0.002 0.036 
 
-5.83***  0.26 
DISC_ACC 0.055 0.089 0.002 0.044 0.104 
 
0.051 0.095 -0.007 0.046 0.111 
 
1.13  0.09 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 12 (continued) 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics Comparison of MINIMIZE versus MIXED Tax Strategies 
 
Descriptive Statistics by Tax Strategy - 
MINIMIZE 
 
Descriptive Statistics by Tax Strategy - MIXED 
 
Tests of Mean and Median 
Differences 
Variable Mean Std Dev 25% Median 75% 
 
Mean 
Std 
Dev 25% Median 75% 
 
Mean 
Difference 
(t)  
Median 
Difference 
(Chi-
Square) 
Tax Strategies 
 
 
 
 
CV_CETR 0.855 0.495 0.458 0.753 1.161 
 
0.634 0.294 0.402 0.56 0.791 
 
15.69***  102.10*** 
CETR3 0.11 0.063 0.059 0.121 0.164 
 
0.334 0.148 0.243 0.292 0.365 
 
-56.70***  3300*** 
Managerial Incentives/Practices 
 
 
 
 
DELTA 674.545 1665.16 61.962 185.237 546.368 
 
488.517 1355.51 43.813 126.24 368.389 
 
3.53***  26.86*** 
VEGA 125.171 259.879 0 0 121.258 
 
81.993 202.712 0 0 65.729 
 
5.35***  34.41*** 
TAXEXPERT 0.579 0.494 0 1 1 
 
0.537 0.499 0 1 1 
 
2.44***  0.03 
INFO 
TRANSFER 
-0.021 0.995 -0.737 -0.267 0.522 
 
-0.094 0.986 -0.792 -0.294 0.371 
 
2.13**  0.91 
Tax Planning 
 
 
 
 
SIZE 7.599 1.463 6.6 7.468 8.483 
 
7.657 1.37 6.647 7.492 8.541 
 
-1.18  0.13 
LEVERAGE 0.178 0.148 0.034 0.164 0.275 
 
0.173 0.14 0.041 0.16 0.265 
 
1.04  0.56 
PPE 0.263 0.226 0.092 0.181 0.367 
 
0.254 0.191 0.109 0.205 0.347 
 
1.27  9.84*** 
FOR_OP 0.147 0.355 0 0 0 
 
0.126 0.332 0 0 0 
 
1.80  3.06*** 
TLCF 0.522 0.5 0 1 1 
 
0.481 0.5 0 0 1 
 
2.34**  0.02 
SEGMENTS 3.438 2.337 1 3 5 
 
3.631 2.531 1 3 5 
 
-2.29**  0.60 
Performance 
 
 
 
 
CV_PTBI 0.819 1.222 0.24 0.428 0.781 
 
0.562 0.759 0.227 0.383 0.602 
 
7.29***  15.48*** 
ROA 0.065 0.062 0.031 0.058 0.093 
 
0.059 0.061 0.028 0.055 0.088 
 
2.90***  2.49 
BTM 0.467 0.302 0.252 0.405 0.609 
 
0.523 0.321 0.31 0.455 0.661 
 
-5.21***  15.75*** 
Investing/Reporting 
 
 
 
 
RD 0.044 0.056 0 0.019 0.074 
 
0.027 0.045 0 0.002 0.036 
 
9.41***  62.19*** 
DISC_ACC 0.054 0.095 0.001 0.045 0.108 
 
0.051 0.095 -0.007 0.046 0.111 
 
0.72  0.01 
Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions.  
All variables except SUSTAIN, MINIMIZE, MIXED, CETR3, TAXEXPERT, FOR_OP, TLCF, and SEGMENTS have been winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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TABLE 13  
Mixed Tax Strategy Analysis – Multivariate Analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES MIXED MINIMIZE SUSTAIN MIXED 
Managerial Incentives/Practices 
DELTA -0.000073 -0.000037 0.000037 -0.000036 
 -2.532** -1.342 1.342 -1.301 
VEGA 0.000093 0.000635 -0.000635 -0.000543 
 0.431 3.213*** -3.213*** -2.802*** 
TAXEXPERT 0.048678 0.276765 -0.276765 -0.228088 
 0.502 2.742*** -2.742*** -2.760*** 
INFO TRANSFER 0.012978 0.116267 -0.116267 -0.103289 
 0.227 2.004** -2.004** -2.118** 
Tax Planning   
  
SIZE -0.139765 -0.165138 0.165138 0.025373 
 -3.162*** -3.601*** 3.601*** 0.662 
LEVERAGE 0.321611 1.158893 -1.158893 -0.837282 
 0.849 2.976*** -2.976*** -2.676*** 
PPE 1.260662 1.953375 -1.953375 -0.692712 
 3.396*** 5.096*** -5.096*** -2.221** 
FOR_OP 0.002025 0.215656 -0.215656 -0.213631 
 0.015 1.618 -1.618 -1.875* 
TLCF 0.221435 0.304746 -0.304746 -0.083310 
 2.421** 3.237*** -3.237*** -1.082 
SEGMENTS 0.042813 0.013179 -0.013179 0.029634 
 
2.053** 0.604 -0.604 1.694* 
Performance   
  
CV_PTBI 4.533429 4.790853 -4.790853 -0.257424 
 17.974*** 18.938*** -18.938*** -5.498*** 
ROA -12.026693 -9.948474 9.948474 -2.078219 
 -11.008*** -9.005*** 9.005*** -2.700*** 
BTM 0.286963 0.174475 -0.174475 0.112488 
 1.427 0.820 -0.820 0.745 
Investing/Reporting   
  
RD 14.365133 17.908583 -17.908583 -3.543450 
 8.707*** 11.060*** -11.060*** -3.589*** 
DISC_ACC 0.776947 -1.259526 1.259526 2.036473 
 1.339 -2.087** 2.087** 4.360*** 
IMR 0.141525 -0.729770 0.729770 0.871295 
 0.292 -1.406 1.406 2.114** 
Constant -0.297946 -1.225981 1.225981 0.928035 
 
-0.217 -0.752 0.752 0.701 
   
  
Pseudo R-Square 0.197 0.197  
Observations 4,663 4,663 4,663 4,663 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. 
Each multinomial logistic regression model is estimated with industry fixed effects (two-digit SIC code). 
All variables except SUSTAIN, MINIMIZE, FOR_OP, TLCF, SEGMENTS, and IMR have been winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles. 
The base group for comparison in the analysis in columns (1) and (2) is SUSTAIN; the base group for comparison in 
the analysis in columns (3) and (4) is MINIMIZE. 
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TABLE 14  
Both Tax Strategy Analysis – Univariate Comparisons 
 
Descriptive Statistics by Tax Strategy - 
SUSTAIN 
 
Descriptive Statistics by Tax Strategy -  
BOTH 
 
Tests of Mean and Median 
Differences 
Variable Mean 
Std 
Dev 25% Median 75% 
 
Mean 
Std 
Dev 25% Median 75% 
 
Mean 
Difference 
(t)  
Median 
Difference 
(Chi-
Square) 
Tax Strategies 
 
 
 
 
CV_CETR 0.191 0.072 0.136 0.192 0.248 
 
0.237 0.061 0.198 0.246 0.283 
 
-9.71***  p < 0.01 
CETR3 0.287 0.078 0.235 0.291 0.341 
 
0.152 0.041 0.131 0.162 0.185 
 
32.84***  p < 0.01 
Managerial Incentives/Practices 
 
 
 
 
DELTA 872.67 2066.32 74.55 210.36 660.71 
 
1122.16 2334.40 118.733 341.780 1109.83 
 
-1.76*  p = 0.02 
VEGA 124.13 262.40 0 0 119.64 
 
201.480 358.473 0 0 216.980 
 
-4.33***  p = 0.24 
TAXEXPERT 0.603 0.489 0 1 1 
 
0.668 0.472 0 1 1 
 
-1.96**  p = 0.92 
INFO 
TRANSFER 
0.166 1.025 -0.608 -0.033 0.757 
 
0.331 1.125 -0.568 0.063 1.034 
 
-2.36**  p = 0.27 
Tax Planning 
 
 
 
 
SIZE 8.256 1.432 7.218 8.175 9.205 
 
8.552 1.447 7.456 8.452 9.438 
 
-3.03***  p = 0.06 
LEVERAGE 0.166 0.129 0.056 0.158 0.25 
 
0.168 0.110 0.088 0.168 0.251 
 
-0.25  p = 0.44 
PPE 0.255 0.179 0.129 0.21 0.339 
 
0.269 0.214 0.128 0.186 0.342 
 
-1.11  p = 0.01 
FOR_OP 0.138 0.345 0 0 0 
 
0.166 0.373 0 0 0 
 
-1.16  p = 0.29 
TLCF 0.407 0.491 0 0 1 
 
0.465 0.500 0 0 1 
 
-1.73*  p = 0.10 
SEGMENTS 3.649 2.333 1 3 5 
 
4.294 2.455 3 4 6 
 
-4.06***  p < 0.01 
Performance 
 
 
 
 
CV_PTBI 0.244 0.15 0.138 0.206 0.319 
 
0.245 0.149 0.143 0.199 0.310 
 
-0.10  p = 0.76 
ROA 0.093 0.054 0.058 0.089 0.122 
 
0.087 0.046 0.054 0.084 0.114 
 
1.51  p = 0.76 
BTM 0.386 0.245 0.217 0.336 0.506 
 
0.360 0.227 0.212 0.278 0.453 
 
1.55  p = 0.02 
Investing/Reporting 
 
 
 
 
RD 0.019 0.032 0 0.001 0.025 
 
0.038 0.042 0.004 0.024 0.057 
 
-8.98***  p < 0.01 
DISC_ACC 0.055 0.089 0.002 0.044 0.104 
 
0.078 0.086 0.022 0.072 0.124 
 
-3.83***  p < 0.01 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 14 (continued) 
 
Descriptive Statistics by Tax Strategy - 
MINIMIZE 
 
Descriptive Statistics by Tax Strategy -  
BOTH 
 
Tests of Mean and 
Median Differences 
Variable Mean 
Std 
Dev 25% Median 75% 
 
Mean Std Dev 25% Median 75% 
 
Mean 
Difference 
(t)  
Median 
Difference 
(Chi-
Square) 
Tax Strategies 
 
 
 
 
CV_CETR 0.855 0.495 0.458 0.753 1.161 
 
0.237 0.061 0.198 0.246 0.283 
 
20.22***  p < 0.01 
CETR3 0.11 0.063 0.059 0.121 0.164 
 
0.152 0.041 0.131 0.162 0.185 
 
-9.99***  p < 0.01 
Managerial Incentives/Practices 
 
 
 
 
DELTA 674.545 1665.16 61.962 185.237 546.368 
 
1122.155 2334.404 118.733 341.780 1109.830 
 
-3.92***  p < 0.01 
VEGA 125.171 259.879 0 0 121.258 
 
201.480 358.473 0 0 216.980 
 
-4.28***  p = 0.59 
TAXEXPERT 0.579 0.494 0 1 1 
 
0.668 0.472 0 1 1 
 
-2.64***  p = 0.93 
INFO 
TRANSFER 
-0.021 0.995 -0.737 -0.267 0.522 
 
0.331 1.125 -0.568 0.063 1.034 
 
-5.17***  p < 0.01 
Tax Planning 
 
 
 
 
SIZE 7.599 1.463 6.6 7.468 8.483 
 
8.552 1.447 7.456 8.452 9.438 
 
-9.72***  p < 0.01 
LEVERAGE 0.178 0.148 0.034 0.164 0.275 
 
0.168 0.110 0.088 0.168 0.251 
 
0.96  p = 0.88 
PPE 0.263 0.226 0.092 0.181 0.367 
 
0.269 0.214 0.128 0.186 0.342 
 
-0.39  p = 0.44 
FOR_OP 0.147 0.355 0 0 0 
 
0.166 0.373 0 0 0 
 
-0.75  p = 0.52 
TLCF 0.522 0.5 0 1 1 
 
0.465 0.500 0 0 1 
 
1.64*  p = 0.91 
SEGMENTS 3.438 2.337 1 3 5 
 
4.294 2.455 3 4 6 
 
-5.36***  p < 0.01 
Performance 
 
 
 
 
CV_PTBI 0.819 1.222 0.24 0.428 0.781 
 
0.245 0.149 0.143 0.199 0.310 
 
6.91***  p < 0.01 
ROA 0.065 0.062 0.031 0.058 0.093 
 
0.087 0.046 0.054 0.084 0.114 
 
-5.33***  p < 0.01 
BTM 0.467 0.302 0.252 0.405 0.609 
 
0.360 0.227 0.212 0.278 0.453 
 
5.20***  p < 0.01 
Investing/Reporting 
 
 
 
 
RD 0.044 0.056 0 0.019 0.074 
 
0.038 0.042 0.004 0.024 0.057 
 
1.42  p = 0.09 
DISC_ACC 0.054 0.095 0.001 0.045 0.108 
 
0.078 0.086 0.022 0.072 0.124 
 
-3.77***  p < 0.01 
Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions.  
All variables except SUSTAIN, MINIMIZE, MIXED, CETR3, TAXEXPERT, FOR_OP, TLCF, and SEGMENTS have been winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
 
